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AN ANALYSIS OF RECENT PROPOSALS 
FOR REFORM OF FEDERAL 
SECURITIES LEGISLATION 
William H. Painter* 
T ODAY the securities industry is in the midst of rapid change. Indeed it has been for at least the past decade,1 but in recent 
years the pace of change has increased, and its emphasis has shifted. 
Legislative and administrative reforms that could not have been 
anticipated a decade ago are likely in the near future, and it is still 
impossible to predict accurately the shape of the markets of tomor-
row or the rules by which they will be governed. It is the purpose of 
this Article to focus on these recent developments, to summarize and 
evaluate various proposals for reform, and to attempt a rough pre-
diction of the shape of things to come-although prophecy is at 
best an inexact, if not a hazardous, endeavor. 
I. BACKGROUND OF THE RECENT CHANGES 
The seeds of the present developments were sown over the past 
decade by two major and interrelated phenomena. The first is the 
rapid institutionalization of the securities markets. Not only do in-
stitutions such as investment companies, pension funds, bank trust 
departments, and insurance companies own increasing percentages 
of the outstanding equities of large, publicly held corporations,2 but, 
• Professor of Law, University of Illinois. A.B. 1950, Princeton University; LL.B. 
1954, Harvard University. The author served as Special Counsel and Director of the 
House of Representatives Study of the Securities Industry, Subcommittee on Commerce 
and Finance, Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 92d Cong., 1st and 2d 
Sess. (1971-1972). The views contained herein are those of the author and do not neces-
sarily represent those of the committee or its subcommittee. 
I. The most important changes that occurred in the early and middle 1960's were 
the various reforms resulting from the Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC) 
REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES MARKETS (H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st 
Sess. (1963)) [hereinafter SPECIAL STUDY] and the rapid evolution of SEC anti-fraud pro-
visions, particularly rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.lOb-5 (1973), which today extends far 
beyond the fraud area to cover such problems as insider trading by investment ad-
visors and securities analysts, false or misleading press releases, and other activities that 
formerly were thought to be governed exclusively by state law. See generally I A. 
BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW: FRAUD-SEC RULE lOb-5, §§ 2.2-.4 (1971); 3 L. Loss, SECU-
RITIES REGULATION 1445-74 (2d ed. 1961); 6 id. 3556-3647 (Supp. 1969); W. PAINTER, 
FEDERAL REGULATION OF INSIDER TRADING 19-23, 153-67, 310-16 (1968). 
2. 5 SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMMN., INSTITUTIONAL !NvESTOR STUDY REPORT 2549-715 
(H.R. Doc. No. 92-64, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971)) [hereinafter INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR 
STUDY]. For example, institutional holdings of stocks listed on the New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE) grew from 12.7 per cent in 1949 to 17.2 per cent in 1959, 26.6 per 
cent in 1970, and 28.3 per cent in 1971. These percentages do not include holdings of 
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because of the institutional investor's emphasis on short-term per-
formance, rather than long-term investment, as a philosophy of 
portfolio management, an increasing percentage of dollar and share 
volume trading on the exchanges and the third and fourth markets3 
has been due to institutional activity.4 The second phenomenon is 
the resistance of the securities business to the pressures for in-
ternal changes caused by such institutionalization. The primary 
areas in which change has been resisted are (a) the system of fixed 
commission rates charged by members of exchanges to nonmember 
broker-dealers or to members of the public, and (b) the method of 
bank-administered personal trust funds and foreign institutions. If the latter were in-
cluded, along with mutual funds not registered with the SEC, private hedge funds, 
and nonbank trusts, the percentage of institutionally owned NYSE-listed stocks would 
probably have been in excess of 40 per cent as of the end of 1971. NEW Yorut STOCK 
EXCHANGE, INC., FACT BOOK 50 (1972) [hereinafter NYSE FACT BOOK]. 
3. The "third market" is a term applied to over-the-counter trading in NYSE-listed 
securities by non-NYSE member firms. The "fourth market" refers to direct trading 
between investors who thereby avoid the use of a broker. S. ROBBINS, THE SECURITIES 
MARKETS 253, 257 (1966). 
4. Institutional trading on the NYSE, expressed as a percentage of share volume, 
grew from 26.2 per cent in 1961 to 42.4 per cent in 1969 and 45.7 per cent in the first 
half of 1971. NYSE FACT BooK, supra note 2, at 52. Expressed as a percentage of dollar 
volume, such trading amounted to 29.2 per cent in 1961, 46.2 per cent in 1969, and 
52,4 per cent in the first half of 1971. Id. In terms of public volume on the NYSE (i.e., 
omitting trades of member firms for their own accounts), institutional participation in 
trading (as compared with public individual participation) is even greater. Such parti-
cipation in 1961, 1969, and the first half of 1971, expressed in terms of share volume, 
was 33.3 per cent, 55.9 per cent, and 59.7 per cent, respectively. In terms of dollar 
volume, such participation was 38.7 per cent, 61.9 per cent, and 68.2 per cent during 
these respective periods. Id. at 53. As previously indicated, see note 2 supra, these 
percentage figures would be higher if trading by foreign institutions and bank-admin-
istered personal trust funds were included. 
Although trading by individuals rose during these years, trading by institutions 
rose at a substantially greater rate. Thus, by the middle of 1971 individuals accounted 
for only 30.8 per cent of the NYSE's total share volume and less than 25 per cent of 
the NYSE's dollar volume. NYSE FACT BooK, supra note 2, at 52. 
The percentage of trading by individuals has also declined on other markets. Id. at 
53. In addition, the total value of shares traded in other markets has steadily increased. 
For example, the market value of shares traded on regional exchanges (as a percentage 
of the market value of shares traded on all registered exchanges) increased from 6.8 
per cent in 1961 to 10.9 per cent in 1971. Third market trading increased from 2.7 per 
cent in the first quarter of 1967 to 7.8 per cent in the fourth quarter of 1971 (expressed 
as a percentage of total NYSE trading). SUBCOMM. ON COMMERCE AND FINANCE OF THE 
HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, SECURITIES INDUSTRY STUDY, H.R. 
REP. No. 92-1519, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. II7, 130 (1972) [hereinafter HOUSE REPoRT]. For 
further statistics, see SUBCOMM. ON SECURITIES OF THE SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, HOUS-
ING AND URBAN AFFAIRS, SECURITIES INDUSIRY STUDY, s. Doc. No. 93-13, 93d Cong., 1st 
Sess. 92 (1973) [hereinafter SENATE REPORT], which indicates that the percentage of 
trading taking place on regional exchanges and the third market in the most actively 
traded NYSE-listed stocks is significantly higher than the percentage for all such listed 
stocks. Thus, in the fourth quarter of 1971, 30.3 per cent of the total trading in 50 of 
the most active issues took place on regional exchanges or in the third market. In the 
case of one stock, Procter &: Gamble, 52.6 per cent of the trading was on markets other 
than the NYSE. 
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processing secunt1es transactions-from a customer's order, to its 
execution on the floor of an exchange or in the over-the-counter 
market, to the eventual delivery of one or more stock certificates. 
The catalyst that increased the pressure for change in the indus-
try was the severe financial crisis in the markets from 1967 until 
late 1970. The "bull" market that existed in the early part of the 
period created a mood of euphoria among many investors, particu-
larly those interested in speculation or short-term profit, and among 
broker-dealers, who profited from the steadily rising prices and high 
trading volume. But these conditions carried with them the classic 
signs of instability, as underlying fundamentals of investment were 
sacrificed to the lure of rapid performance. The investment some-
times became less important than the prospect of reselling the 
security at a profit to a "bigger fool." 
The securities industry's response to these market conditions 
was, if not predictable, at least characteristic. Firms expanded their 
sales forces to meet the increased needs generated by investor en-
thusiasm but failed to provide the proper logistical support of a 
corresponding expansion and modernization of facilities for proces-
sing securities transactions. As one ·writer put it: 
A middle-aged investor who dealt with the same brokerage firm 
during the past 25 years might have observed that, as volume 
mounted, striking transformations occurred in the physical appear-
ance of the office, the character of the personnel, and the speed with 
which he was able to obtain information. The board room that he 
visited to check the current status of the market was more comfort-
able and the visual displays more complete and easier to see ..•• The 
investor now could obtain a wide range of current statistics on price, 
volume, dividends, and earnings by simply pressing the appropriate 
keys of an electronic machine. All in all, he would be very pleased, 
not only with the conveniences afforded him, but because these very 
same innovations indicated the firm's ability to keep pace with chang-
ing times .... But had he asked for a description of the path his 
order took, from the time he submitted it until he finally received 
a stock certificate, his registered representative might have presented 
a flow diagram yellowed with age. In other words, from a systems 
viewpoint, there was little change. 
Had the customer visited the backo.ffice of his brokerage house, 
he probably would have experienced a growing discomfort. Thread-
ing his way through the crowds of personnel hurrying about their 
business, he would find that more people in the same physical loca-
tion made the atmosphere denser, the noise louder, and the general 
environment dingier.Ii 
5. S. Robbins, W. Werner, C. Johnson & A. Greenwald, Paper Crisis in the Securities 
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The stock certificate, although an integral part of the paperwork 
problem, was only partially responsible for the reigning confusion 
and complexity, for many other pieces of paper were also involved. 
A typical broker-dealer uses at least thirty-three different docu-
ments in a single transaction; an error in any step of the chain may 
double the number of documents required.6 Indeed, in one large 
brokerage firm, no fewer than 210 pieces of paper were required to 
consummate a single transaction.7 ·with each additional step, the 
likelihood of losing securities increased. Added to the confusion of 
paperwork was the problem of theft of certificates while they were 
being delivered from one broker to another or to a clearing house. 
Estimates in 1971 of the total amount of stolen or missing securities 
range from 1.2 billion dollars to ten billion dollars.8 The failure of 
one brokerage firm was attributed to a theft of securities worth 1.8 
million dollars. 9 
Brokerage firms euphemistically describe stolen or missing secur-
ities as short stock record differences or short securities differences. 
These generic terms also embrace securities that cannot be located 
even though firm records indicate that they should be in the firm's 
possession or otherwise accounted for (as, for instance, having been 
pledged as collateral for a loan). Conversely, long stock record dif-
ferences are securities on hand, the ownership of which the firm can-
not ascertain. During the period leading up to the financial crisis, 
both short and long stock record differences often amounted to 
Industry: Causes and Cures 22-23 (Lybrand, Ross Bros. &: Montgomery 1969), reprinted 
in Hearings on the Securities Industry Before the Subcomm. on Commerce and 
Finance of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 
pt. 4, at 2159, 2187-88 (1971) [hereinafter House Hearings]. 
6. North American Rockwell Information Systems Co., Securities Industries Over-
view Study 13 (1969), reprinted in House Hearings, supra note 5, pt. 4, at 2069; HousE 
REPORT, supra note 4, at 60. 
7. House Hearings, supra note 5, pt. l!, at 1597 (testimony of Robert R. Maller, vice-
president, United States Trust Co. of New York). 
8. HouSE REPORT, supra note 4, at 75. An even higher estimate was recently given 
by W. Henry DuPont, Chairman of the Securities Validation Corporation, who told 
the Permanent Investigations Subcommittee of the Senate Government Operations 
Committee in early 1973 that the probable amount of lost, missing, and stolen govern-
ment, state, municipal, and corporate securities may be in the neighborhood of 50 bil-
lion dollars. BNA SEC. REG. & L. REP. No. 209, at A-IO CTuly 4, 197!1). For reports of 
other testimony before the Senate Permanent Investigations Subcommittee regarding 
crime in the securities industry, see Wall St. J., July 16, 1973, at 8, col. 3 (midwest ed.); 
N.Y. Times, July 14, 1973, at 1, col. 5 (city ed.). 
9. HouSE REPORT, supra note 4, at 75. More recently, then Attorney General Richard 
Kleindienst, in an address to the Trust Division of American Bankers Association, re-
ported that the amount of stocks and bonds stolen annually had been reduced from an 
estimated 675 million dollars in 1971 to 270 million dollars in 1972, but that thefts 
still continue to threaten a "serious disruption" of the securities business. BNA. SEC. 
REG. & L. REP. No. 188, at A-12 (Feb. 7, 1973). 
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millions of dollars of securities.10 Although some firms attempted to 
offset their short securities differences by the amount of their long 
securities differences, this practice was misleading, for it assumed 
that a missing security can be replaced by a security whose owner-
ship is in doubt. Replacement can occur only if the true ownership 
of the latter security is never ascertained, and, even then, it is prob-
able that securities of unknown ownership are subject to state laws 
governing escheat or disposition of abandoned property.11 
As volume of trading mounted, inadequate bookkeeping and 
slipshod methods of handling the mechanical aspects of trades, 
generally referred to as clearance and settlement, caused some firms 
to lose control over their own procedures. Control, once lost, was 
difficult to regain, since personnel would generally find it necessary 
to process current trades before researching long or short securities 
differences. Thus, the problem tended to feed upon itself, and diffi-
culties multiplied. Shoddy bookkeeping practices or loss of opera-
tional control in one firm could create problems in other firms.12 
For instance, if one firm failed to deliver securities to another on the 
date agreed upon,13 the "fail to deliver," although described for 
bookkeeping purposes as an asset ("fails to receive") by the second 
firm, would frequently hamper its ability to meet its commitments 
to third parties. Although the level of fails has generally been con-
sidered a good indicator of the operational problems of the broker-
age business, data on fails were not compiled prior to April 1968.14 
By the end of that year, the level of fails had climbed to a high of 
4.13 billion dollars.15 Although the level gradually declined there-
after (rising briefly again in 1971 after the crisis had passed),16 prob-
lems of operational control persisted. 
10. SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMMN., STUDY OF UNSAFE AND UNSOUND PRACTICES OF 
BROKERS AND DEALERS 100-05 (H.R. Doc. No. 92-231, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971)) [herein-
after SEC UNSAFE AND UNSOUND PRACTICES STUDY]. See also H. BARUCH, WALL STREET: 
SECURITY RISK 94-96 (1971). 
11. See H. BARUCH, supra note 10, at 140. 
12. The possible "domino" effect of a failure of one or more brokerage houses and 
the high degree of interdependence among broker-dealer firms is discussed in SENATE 
REPORT, supra note 4, at 38. 
13. Until February of 1968 the settlement period for regular transactions was four 
business days. This was extended to five business days as part of the effort to meet the 
financial crisis. See House Hearings, supra note 5, pt. 1, at 32; NYSE Rule 64, 2 CCH 
NYSE GUIDE ,I 2064 (1968). 
14. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 4, at 5; House Hearings, supra note 5, pt. 1, at 19. 
15. House Hearings, supra note 5, pt. I, at 11, 33; HouSE REPORT, supra note 4, at 5. 
The data are limited to NYSE member firm trades in both listed and unlisted securities. 
For similar data covering a statistical sampling of National Association of Securities 
Dealers (NASD) member firms that are not NYSE or American Stock Exchange (AMEX) 
members, see House Hearings, supra note 5, pt. I, at 43-44. 
16. House Hearings, supra note 5, pt. I, at 11, 44. 
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The sharp drop in securities prices that began early in 1969, 
accompanied by a decline in the volume of trading later that year, 
had the effect of whipsawing firms plagued with the troubles already 
described, and many firms were eventually forced to close their 
doors.17 Shrinking commission income was inadequate to finance 
the resolution of past operational problems or to support the ex-
panded sales organizations and branch offices acquired in the preced-
ing bull market. Firms were forced to curtail their operations and 
suffer further losses of commission income. Moreover, the sharp 
drop in securities prices created deficiencies in firm capital invested 
in securities. In some instances, securities held in firm capital ac-
counts were found to have little or no marketability (as in the case 
of restricted or letter stock).18 Firms that had derived working capi-
tal through the use of customers' free credit balances or excess 
margin securities19 experienced a similar capital decline when the 
value of the securities in customers' margin accounts fell and the 
accounts were closed out to meet margin calls. Customers grew in-
creasingly intent on retrieving any credit balances in their favor, 
thus adding to the firms' financial decline. Finally, the capital prob-
lems of many firms were exacerbated by withdrawals of capital con-
tributed to firms through subordinated loans, the terms of which 
commonly provided for termination after a few months' notice.20 
As may be evident from the foregoing, the financial crisis and 
collapse of brokerage firms were only superficially due to the whip-
saw conditions created by the high volume bull market followed by 
the shrinking volume bear market of 1969-1970. More profound rea-
sons for the crisis were the overemphasis on sales to the detriment 
of more mundane back office operations, slipshod and inadequate 
bookkeeping, archaic procedures for processing trades, excessive 
17. The financial crisis and its causes are discussed in greater detail in HousE 
REPORT, supra note 4, at 9-12. 
18. House Hearings, supra note 5, pt. 2, at 753 (statement of Irving M. Pollack, then 
Director of the SEC's Division of Trading and Markets). "Restricted" or "letter" stock 
is stock that normally cannot be disposed of without registration under the Securities 
Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1970). 
19. "Free credit balances" are amounts payable on demand to customers of broker-
dealers. They may arise from a cash deposit by a customer with a broker-dealer in 
anticipation of the customer's placing an order to purchase securities, from a sale of 
a customer's securities when the broker-dealer holds the proceeds pending instruction:. 
by the customer, or from the broker-dealer's receipt of dividends or interest on the 
customer's securities. See HouSE REPORT, supra note 4, at 38. "Excess margin securities" 
are those securities in a customer's margin account having a market value in excess of 
the amount required to be maintained on deposit to secure his margin indebtedness. 
See SEC UNSAFE AND UNSOUND PRACTICES STUDY, supra note IO, at 125. Statistics on the 
level of both free credit balances and excess margin securities for the years 1968-1970 
at the twenty-five largest NYSE member firms are collected in id. at 141-43, tables 14 
&: 15. 
20. See SEC UNSAFE AND UNSOUND PRACTICES STUDY, supra note IO, at 54-63. 
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dependence on customers' funds and securities for working capital, 
unwise investment of firm capital in speculative stocks, and the 
transitory or ephemeral character of capital derived from subor-
dinated loans than can be withdrawn on short notice. In view of 
this, it might well be asked not why there were so many brokerage 
failures, but how the industry itself managed to survive. 
Reaction to the crisis in the securities markets was quick. In 
1970, Congress passed the Securities Investor Protection Act21 to 
provide insurance protection for customers of insolvent brokerage 
21. Pub. L. No. 91-598, 84 Stat. 1636 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78aaa-78lll (1970)). 
Probably the most important effect of the Act was its establishment of the Securities 
Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC) to provide insurance protection for customers 
of insolvent brokerage firms. Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, § 3, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78ccc (1970). The corporation provides coverage of up to 50,000 dollars for the ac-
count of any one customer of a member broker-dealer; however, only 20,000 dollars of 
that sum may be allocated to reimbursement of losses in cash accounts. Securities 
Investor Protection Act of 1970, § 6(f)(l), 15 U.S.C. § 78fff(f)(l) (1970). 
The Act requires membership in SIPC for all broker-dealers who are members of 
a national securities exchange and for those registered as brokers or dealers under 
section 15(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b) (1970), except 
those whose business consists exclusively of (i) the distribution of shares of registered 
open end investment companies or unit investment trusts, (ii) the sale of variable an-
nuities, (iii) the business of insurance, or (iv) the business of rendering investment 
advisor services to one or more registered investment companies or insurance company 
separate accounts. Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, § 3(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78ccc 
(a) (1970). 
SIPC is financed by assessments collected from its members. If the fund created by 
such assessments should prove inadequate to reimburse customers for losses (as in some 
major financial catastrophe), SIPC is authorized to borrow from the United States 
Treasury upon a line of credit in the amount of one billion dollars. Securities Investor 
Protection Act of 1970, § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 78ddd (1970). 
Among the other important features of the legislation are provisions authorizing 
SIPC to apply for judicial appointment of a trustee for member firms in the event of 
the occurrence of certain specified conditions, such as insolvency, bankruptcy, or failure 
to comply with SEC or other rules relating to financial responsibility or hypothecation 
of customers' securities. Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 
78eee (1970). The purpose of such a proceeding is to liquidate the affairs of the member 
firm and to return to customers as promptly as possible their "specifically identifiable 
property" or, if their property cannot be identified, to make payments to customers 
from a "single and separate fund" held for customers' accounts. Securities Investor 
Protection Act of ,1970, § 6, 15 U.S.C. § 78fff (1970). 
In addition, section 15(c)(3) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 was amended to 
require the SEC to promulgate rules requiring the "maintenance of reserves with 
respect to customers' deposits or credit balances" and to allow the SEC to promulgate 
rules dealing with the acceptance of custody and use by broker-dealers of customers' 
securities. Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, § 7(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c)(3) (1970). 
The Act has not been given retroactive effect. Loh£ v. Casey, 466 F.2d 618 (10th Cir. 
1972). See also SEC v. Alan F. Hughes, Inc., 461 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1972) (upheld proce-
dure for appointing receiver of brokerage firm); Bohart-McCaslin Ventures, Inc. v. 
Midwestern Sec. Corp., 352 F. Supp. 937 (N.D. Tex. 1973) (customer of broker-dealer 
held to have no individual cause of action under the statute). See generally Note, 
Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970: An Early Assessment, 73 COLUM. L. REv. 
802 (1973). 
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firms. Both branches of Congress commissioned thorough studies of 
the problems underlying the 1967-1970 crisis; the House Commit-
tee's Report was submitted in October 1972,22 and the Senate Com-
mittee's Report was completed in February 1973.23 At the same time, 
four other studies of the securities markets were conducted, three by 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)24 and one by William 
McChesney Martin, Jr., former Chairman of the Board of Governors 
of the Federal Reserve System and former President of the New 
York Stock Exchange (NYSE).25 Thus, during a two-year period the 
securities industry was the subject of at least six separate major 
studies, while many other studies were made of particular problems, 
such as clearance and settlement procedures, the development of a 
machine-readable certificate, and the complete elimination of the 
stock certificate. 26 
To attempt to summarize and compare in detail the findings, 
recommendations, and ramifications of all of these studies would be 
difficult and somewhat hazardous. Perhaps the best way in which to 
approach the problem is to concentrate on certain major areas in 
which reforms or changes are likely, using the congressional studies 
as a point of reference. In this way, the proposals made by each 
study on a particular topic may be contrasted, and some indication 
of likely legislative or administrative changes may be obtained. 
There are at least three principal areas of interest: (1) methods 
of strengthening and promoting broker-dealer financial stability and 
simplifying procedures for processing securities transactions; (2) 
methods of strengthening the mechanism of self-regulation; and (3) 
changes in the structure of the market to lessen tensions created by 
the interrelationship between the institutionalization of the markets 
and the commission rate structure. 
22. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 4. 
23. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 4. 
24. See INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR STUDY, supra note 2; SEC UNSAFE AND UNSOUND 
PRACTICES STUDY, supra note IO; Hearings on Structure, Operation and Regulation of 
Securities Markets Before the Securities if Exchange Commn. (File No. 4-147, 1971). These 
hearings resulted in a far-reaching policy statement, Securities & Exchange Commn., 
Future Structure of the Securities Markets, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 
9484 (Feb. 2, 1972), 37 Fed. Reg. 5286 (1972), reprinted in House Hearings, supra note 
5, pt. 7, at 3445-59 [hereinafter SEC Future Market Structure Statement]. 
25. W. Martin, The Securities Markets-A Report, With Recommendations (1971), 
reprinted in House Hearings, supra note 5, pt. 6, at 3189-215 [hereinafter Martin Re-
port]. The Martin Report was submitted to the NYSE Board of Governors on August 
5, 1971. 
26. See HousE REPORT, supra note 4, at 62-63. Many of the studies of specific prob-
lems are contained in the House Hearings, supra note 5, pts. 4 & 5, at 2055-889. 
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II. BROKER-DEALER FINANCIAL STABILITY 
A. Uniform Net Capital Requirements 
A weakness of the regulatory structure in the past has been the 
diversity of rules applicable to broker-dealers. An illustration of this 
is the SEC's requirement of a specified minimum net capital for en-
try into the brokerage business.27 To remain in the brokerage busi-
ness, a broker-dealer must also maintain a specified net capital ratio, 
defined as the relationship between a broker's aggregate indebted-
ness28 and his net capital.29 The SEC exempted members of prin-
cipal national securities exchanges from the application of its net 
capital rule because it found that the requirements of the exchanges' 
own rules were "more comprehensive" than those of the SEC rules.30 
Although this may have been true when the SEC's exemption was 
granted, many exchanges subsequently loosened their interpreta-
tions of the net capital requirements, so that member firms became 
subject to equal or more lenient standards than firms that were not 
members of exchanges. For example, although the NYSE required a 
net capital ratio of fifteen to one in November 1944, the effective 
date of its exemption from the SEC rule, the figure was eventually 
raised to twenty to one, the same ratio as that prescribed by the 
SEC.31 Moreover, the exchanges and the SEC followed different pro-
27. A broker's net capital is bis net worth (i.e., the excess of total assets over total 
liabilities), adjusted by unrealized profits and losses and deductions for the value of 
assets that are not readily convertible into cash and for a percentage of the market 
value of liquid assets that might decrease in value before they are sold. See 17 C.F.R. 
§ 240.15c3-l(c)(2) (1973). 
Under the SEC's recently amended rule, a broker-dealer who carries customers' 
accounts and engages in the general brokerage business must have a minimum net 
capital of 25,000 dollars. Broker-dealers who engage exclusively in selling mutual funds 
and do not engage in the general brokerage business are subject to lesser requirements. 
17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-l(a) (1973). 
The NYSE imposes minimum requirements ranging from 25,000 dollars to 100,000 
dollars, depending upon the type of business done by a member firm. See NYSE Rule 
325(a), 2 CCH NYSE GUIDE ,I 2325(a) (1973). 
28. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-l(c)(l) (1973) for the SEC's definition of aggregate in-
debtedness. 
29. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-l(a) (1973). The present ratio required by the SEC is 20:1 
(i.e., aggregate indebtedness cannot exceed 20 times net capital), but a proposed revision 
of rule 15c3-l will require a ratio of 15:1. Under the proposed revision at least 30 
per cent of a firm's capital would have to be in the form of equity. See Securities Ex-
change Act Release No. 9891 (Dec. 5, 1972), 38 Fed. Reg. 56 (1973). During a broker-
dealer's first year of business it would be subject to a minimum net capital ratio of 
8:1.ld. 
30. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-l(b)(2) (1973). The exchanges so exempted are the AMEX, 
the Boston Stock Exchange, the Midwest Stock Exchange, the NYSE, the Pacific Coast 
Stock Exchange, the Philadelphia-Baltimore-Washington (PBW) Stock Exchange, and 
the Chicago Board Options Exchange, Inc. 
31. The NYSE applied a 20:1 ratio from September 1, 1953, to August I, 1971, when 
August 1973] Federal Securities Legislation 1585 
cedures in computing net capital. For example, the NYSE gave credit 
for temporary debt capital provided by subordinated loan agree-
ments, even though such capital might be withdrawn on short 
notice.32 The SEC, on the other hand, required cash or securities in-
cluded in the computation to be loaned for at least one year under a 
"satisfactory subordination agreement" and prohibited repayment 
of the loan when the effect of the repayment would be to put the 
firm in violation of the net capital rule or when the firm was already 
in violation of the rule.33 Although the SEC required that short 
security differences be deducted in the net capital computation,34 the 
NYSE changed the interpretation of its rule to require deduction of 
only such reserves as a member firm might choose to set aside to 
cover the differences. Firms that had established only a minimal re-
serve, or no reserve at all, were thus able to meet the NYSE's net 
capital test even though they had substantial short security differ-
ences on their books. This relaxation in the NYSE's rule took place 
in May 1969 and reflected the substantial short security differences 
that had accumulated on the books of member firms during the 
financial crisis. The NYSE apparently believed that it was more pru-
dent to loosen its net capital rule than to interpret the rule strictly 
and close down large numbers of its member firms.31s Finally, the 
NYSE permitted credit for such items as unsecured receivables (such 
as tax refund and insurance claims), unmarketable securities (such 
as restricted or letter stock), and deposits with clearing corporations; 
under the SEC's rule, such items were not eligible for inclusion in 
the net capital computation.86 
Although substantial reforms were made in the NYSE's net 
capital rule after the financial crisis had passed,37 the House subcom-
it returned to the original 15:1 ratio. See Dept. of Member Firms, New York Stock 
Exchange, Inc., M.F. Educational Circular No. 336 (July 16, 1971) [hereinafter Educa-
tional Circular No. 336], reprinted in House Hearings, supra note 5, pt. I, at 202-04. 
For an extensive discussion, see Case Study of the Interpretation and Enforcement of 
the Net Capital Rule of the New York Stock Exchange [hereinafter Case Study], in 
Hearings on the Securities Industry Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate 
Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 4, at 215-359 
(1972) [hereinafter Senate Hearings]. 
32. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 4, at 27. See also Case Study, supra note 31, at 
258-60. 
33. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3--I(c)(7} (1973). 
34. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3--I(c)(l} (1973). 
35. For an extensive discussion, as well as a chronology of the events leading to the 
change in the NYSE's interpretation of its rule, see House Hearings, supra note 5, pt. 
2, at 859-66; Case Study, supra note 31, at 263-65; SEC UNSAFE AND UNSOUND PRAcrICES 
STUDY, supra note IO, at 103. 
36. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 4, at 29-30. 
37. See Educational Circular No. 336, supra note 31. 
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mittee called for the adoption by the SEC of a single net capital 
rule applicable to all broker-dealers, whether their firms are con-
ducted as corporations or as partnerships. The subcommittee also 
set forth several substantive elements of the proposed uniform SEC 
rule: (1) restrictions on the activities of broker-dealers when their 
capital position becomes tenuous, (2) a requirement that a promis-
sory note, in order to receive capital credit, must impose liability 
on the promisor (a prohibition on non-recourse notes), (3) a per-
centage limitation on the use of subordinated accounts, (4) more 
sophisticated techniques for gauging the effect of fluctuations in 
security values, (5) prohibitions on excessive concentration of in-
vested capital in the securities of any one issuer, (6) restrictions on 
the right to withdraw capital if a firm is in or is approaching finan-
cial difficulty, and (7) a requirement that a specified percentage of 
net capital take the form of equity rather than debt (a limitation on 
the use of subordinated accounts of non-owners of a broker-dealer 
in computing its net capital).38 In at least partial response to these 
recommendations, the SEC has proposed a revision of its rule to 
eliminate the exemption for exchange member firms.39 If the SEC 
proposal is adopted, the only further legislative change needed 
would be to remove from the SEC the power to continue to grant 
exemptions from its rule. A single net capital rule could be flexible 
enough to accommodate the differing requirements of various types 
of broker-dealers, including those primarily engaged in selling shares 
of investment companies, those engaged in retail brokerage, and 
those specializing in brokerage for institutional accounts. Although 
the exchanges and the National Association of Securities Dealers 
(NASD) would be permitted to adopt their own rules to supplement 
the SEC's rule, the latter would remain applicable to all firms, 
thereby establishing minimum financial standards. 
B. Restrictions on Use of Customers' Credit Balances 
and Securities 
As has been previously pointed out,40 broker-dealers have in the 
past derived substantial portions of their working capital from the 
38. See HousE REPORT, supra note 4, at 31-35. The Senate subcommittee saw no 
need for legislation in these respects in view of the SEC's proposed uniform net capital 
rule. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 39. Legislation implementing the House sub• 
committee's recommendations can be found in H.R. 5050, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 304 
(1973). 
39. See SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9891, supra note 29. The proposal 
would not prevent an exchange from imposing stricter requirements than those man-
dated by the rule. 
40. See text accompanying note 19 supra. 
August 1973] Federal Securities Legislation 1587 
use of their customers' credit balances and excess margin and fully 
paid securities. Although segregation of customers' fully paid and 
excess margin securities from those securities owned by the firm it-
self has been required by the rules of the NYSE and the NASD,41 
questionable segregation procedures, which give little, if any, pro-
tection to customers against misuse of their property, have developed 
in recent years. For example, in so-called "one-box" segregation, 
customers' securities are commingled with those of the broker, and 
the segregation is effected solely by bookkeeping entry.42 To call 
this "segregation" is to resort to a fiction. In "bulk" segregation, the 
securities of all customers are kept in one location and arranged 
alphabetically by issuer. Although this method does achieve physical 
segregation of the broker-dealer's securities from those of his cus-
tomers, identification of the ownership interests of particular cus-
tomers is still dependent on accounting entries.43 
Although section 8(c) of the Securities Exchange Act of 193444 
authorizes the SEC to promulgate rules to prevent the hypothecation 
of securities to the detriment of customers, the provision has several 
loopholes. The statute permits a broker-dealer to pledge a customer's 
securities up to any amount as long as the total amount pledged 
does not exceed the total amount owed to the broker-dealer by all 
his customers.4G Furthermore, the broker-dealer may loan (rather 
than pledge) his customer's securities up to any amount if the cus-
tomer's consent has been obtained.46 Such "consents" are generally 
obtained on standard forms as a routine matter.47 If securities are 
pledged by brokers, the lender customarily advances only a portion 
of the fair market value of the securities used to secure the loan, 
but by lending the securities to another broker, a broker may obtain 
their full value.48 Consequently, loans by brokers of their customers' 
securities represent a substantial source of working capital.49 
41. NYSE Rule 402.10, 2 CCH NYSE GUIDE 1l 2402 (1957). See also NASD Rules of 
Fair Practice, art. m, § 19(d), CCH NASD MANUAL 1I 2169 (1967). 
42. See House Hearings, supra note 5, pt. 2, at 966-67. 
43. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 4, at 40. 
44. 15 U.S.C. § 78h(c) (1970). 
45. 15 U.S.C. § 78h(c) (1970). See also House Hearings, supra note 5, pt. 2, at 960. 
46. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 8(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78h(d) (1970). See also House 
Hearings, supra note 5, pt. 2, at 960. 
47. For a typical consent form, see House Hearings, supra note 5, pt. 2, at 961. 
48. Id. at 960-63. See also H. BARUCH, supra note 10, at 38. 
49. See SEC UNSAFE AND UNSOUND PRACTICES STUDY, supra note 10, at 135-38, indi-
cating that substantial amounts of customers' fully paid securities were "loaned in 
error" during the period 1968-1970. The same may be said for securities "pledged in 
error." See id. at 131-35. 
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Although in theory the rules of the exchanges and the NASD 
restricted broker-dealers in their ability to take advantage of these 
loopholes, these rules were so loosely drawn or loosely enforced as 
to be ineffective during the period of financial crisis.5° Consequently, 
under the 1970 amendments to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
the SEC was directed to promulgate rules that "shall require the 
maintenance of reserves with respect to customers' deposits or credit 
balances" and was given authority to promulgate rules relating to 
"the acceptance of custody and use of customers' securities."51 
The SEC did not promulgate a rule to deal with this complex 
problem until nearly two years after its authority had been in-
creased. Although the rule, as eventually adopted, 52 required the 
maintenance of reserves with respect to customers' cash and cash 
realized through the use of customers' securities,53 it did not require 
the segregation of fully paid and excess margin securities from other 
securities in the broker-dealer's possession, but merely prescribed 
that a broker-dealer must obtain "physical possession or control" of 
such securities within specified time periods.54 "Physical possession 
or control" was so defined that segregation practices currently used 
by the industry could be continued.55 The rule did, however, specify 
that securities held in a broker-dealer's "physical possession or con-
trol" would constitute "specifically identifiable property" for pur-
poses of customers' claims against broker-dealers in the event of in-
solvency, thus confirming the priority of customers' claims under 
. the Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC) legislation. 56 
Although the SEC rule constitutes an improvement over the 
pre-existing pattern, further progress along these lines is possible. 
The House subcommittee suggested that "over the longer term, when 
the securities industry is sufficiently well capitalized to permit such 
a move . . . customers' funds should be protected by a complete 
50. E.g., NYSE Rule 402 and NASD Rules of Fair Practice, art. III, supra note 41. 
These rules prohibit a firm from lending or hypothecating more securities carried for 
a customer's account than is "fair and reasonable" in the light of the indebtedness of 
the customer on such securities. "Reasonableness" is defined as 140 per cent of the 
customer's debit balance in the case of hypothecation and 100 per cent of such debit 
balance in the case of loans. See House Hearings, supra note 5, pt. 2, at 962-63. 
51. Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, § 7(d), Pub. L. No. 91-598, 84 Stat. 
1653, amending 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c)(3) (1970). 
52. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-3 (1973). 
53. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.15c3-3(e), 240.15c3-3(a) (1973). 
54. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.15c3-3(b) to (d) (1973). 
55. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-3(c) (1973). 
56. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-3(j) (1973). For a discussion of this aspect of the rule and 
its relationship to the bankruptcy laws, see HousE REPORT, supra note 4, at 45. See also 
SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 1, pt. 1, at 410-14. 
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escrow arrangement. Legislation, if needed, could be patterned after 
the Commodity Exchange Act of 1936, which specifically requires a 
I 00-percent segregation of customers' credit balances from the funds 
of the brokerage operation."57 The subcommittee recognized that, 
although complete segregation of customers' funds might be desir-
able, there are serious practical difficulties in requiring segregation 
of customers' securities. 58 Nonetheless, if it becomes apparent that 
the SEC's rule does not provide sufficient protection for customers, 
it is likely that the subcommittee will either demand that the SEC 
tighten its definition of physical possession or control or propose 
legislation to achieve the same result. 
C. Greater Uniformity in Clearance and Settlement Procedures 
Clearance and settlement is the process that completes a trans-
action, once its price and other terms have been agreed upon by the 
parties, either on the floor of a securities exchange or by telephone 
or other communication between broker-dealers in the over-the-
counter market.59 Each major securities exchange has its own clear-
ance and settlement procedures, and a specified procedure is also 
prescribed by the NASD for the over-the-counter market.60 Although 
appropriate functional differences in clearance and settlement facil-
ities may be justified by differing market characteristics and needs,61 
functional differences should not be perpetuated if their persistence 
is due merely to historical reasons. In view of the likelihood that 
clearance and settlement facilities will be automated in the near 
future, the overriding consideration should be to insure that the 
systems interface with one another.62 
57. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 4, at 43. 
58. Id. at 44. The practical problems arise largely from the increasing use by 
broker-dealers of central certificate depositories, where securities are held for a broker's 
account in the name of a nominee and are frequently in the form of "jumbo" certi-
ficates, which may embrace the securities of several customers. Also, the quantity of 
securities required for segregation is continually changing with purchases and sales, 
mnney receipts and disbursements, and changes in the market value of securities in 
customers' margin accounts. 
59. For a general description of the process, see North American Rockwell Informa-
tion Systems Co., supra note 6, at 10-15, reprinted at 2066-71. 
60. For a description of the two primary methods of effecting clearance (the "daily 
balance order" method and the "continuous net settlement" method), see HousE RE-
PORT, supra note 4, at 61-62. Recently, the NYSE, the AMEX, and the NASD have been 
discussing the creation of a national securities clearing system, which would entail, 
among other things, conversion of the AMEX and the NYSE clearing systems from a 
daily balance order method to continuous net settlement. See Wall St. J., Oct. 1, 1973, 
at 4, col. 3 (midwest ed.); id., Oct. 5, 1973, at 4, col. 2. 
61. See House Hearings, supra note 5, pt. 3, at 1341 (statement of Richard B. 
Howland, executive vice-president, New York Stock Exchange, Inc.). 
62. Today, a large firm has to interface with as many as 15 different systems in its 
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There should also be greater uniformity in the regulation of 
clearance and settlement procedures, with over-all supervision of the 
regulatory framework vested in one organization. Theoretically, 
there are several ways to achieve such uniformity. First, clearance 
and settlement procedures could be centralized in one industry-
owned facility, perhaps through a merger of the clearing corpora-
tions now operated by the securities exchanges with the National 
Clearing Corporation, operated by the NASD. Although this pos-
sibility may have a certain appeal, it entails all the risks and disad-
vantages of any monopoly. The advantages of centralization might 
be counterbalanced by restrictive practices and other abuses. Also 
there is the possibility that, with the passage of time, further inno-
vation and creative change will be impeded. Second, centralization 
might be achieved by vesting all clearance and settlement proce-
dures in a quasi-governmental corporation, similar to the Communi-
cations Satellite Corporation (COMSAT).63 This alternative involves 
the same problems of monopolization as the first suggestion. In addi-
tion, without a clear showing that the regulatory job cannot be done 
by an existing agency, needless proliferation of entities, govern-
mental or otherwise, should be avoided. 
Third, the industry could be permitted a certain measure of plural-
ism, retaining existing systems, but with a greater degree of coordina-
tion and uniformity of regulation. This might be achieved by 
broadening the SEC's supervisory powers to include clearance, settle-
ment, depositories, transfer agents, and registrars. Such an approach 
was suggested by the SEC, and, although the SEC expressly dis-
claimed any desire to extend its authority over the banking in-
dustry, 64 resistance to increased regulation in any form rapidly de-
veloped in banking circles. 65 
Early drafts of the bill to implement the SEC's recommendations 
centralized both rule-making and enforcement powers in the SEC, 
but the SEC's final draft, introduced in both the Senate and the 
House of Representatives, gave the SEC power to set standards for 
depositories and transfer agents while distributing enforcement of 
daily operations. Hearings on S. 3412, S. 3297, and S. 2551 Before the Subcomm. on 
Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 92d Cong., 
2d Sess. 139 (1972) (statement of Robert M. Gardiner, chairman of the board, Securities 
Industry Association). 
63. See House Hearings, supra note 5, at pt. 3, 1377-80 (statement of Junius W. 
Peake, general partner, Shields & Co.). See also id. at 1444-47. 
64. SEC UNSAFE AND UNSOUND PRACTICES STUDY, supra note IO, at 6. 
65. See generally BNA SEC. REG. & L. REP. No. 176, at B-1 to -4 (Nov. 8, 1972). See 
also text accompanying note 71 infra. 
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the rules between the SEC and the federal and state bank regulatory 
authorities.66 A bill carrying out this scheme passed the Senate in 
the late summer of 1972.67 In the House Subcommittee on Com-
merce and Finance there was some initial skepticism about the de-
sirability of distributing enforcement powers over bank transfer 
agents and depositories among federal and state banking authorities.68 
Eventually, however, the House subcommittee reported out a meas-
ure dividing authority between the SEC and the banking authori-
ties, but also giving the SEC authority to inspect bank transfer 
agents.00 Under this formulation, any dispute between the SEC and 
the banking authorities as to the appropriate method of regulating 
and enforcing rules relating to bank transfer agents would ultimately 
be decided by the SEC. The bill passed the House of Representa-
tives on October 13, 1972.70 A compromise measure died on the 
floor of the Senate under the threat of a filibuster shortly before 
Congress adjourned. Although there were rumors that the bill's 
def eat in the Senate was due to pressures from the banking indus-
try, 71 this was never confirmed. It is hazardous to predict Congress' 
next step. A bill similar to the 1972 measure passed the Senate on 
August 1, 1973.72 Renewed efforts by the House subcommittee to 
toughen the legislation, even if successful in the House, may meet 
substantial resistance in the Senate, and a compromise of some type 
will eventually have to be reached. Meanwhile, the SEC lacks suffi-
cient authority to proceed with further regulation in the area, and 
the industry must at least temporarily forego the estimated 400 to 
700 million dollars in savings73 that would have resulted from the 
legislation, had it become law. 
The Senate and House subcommittees do appear to agree that 
the stock certificate itself should eventually be eliminated as a 
66. See S. 3412, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972); H.R. 14567, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972). 
67. S. 3876, passed by the Senate, Aug. 4, 1972, in 118 CoNG. REc. S12785 (daily ed. 
Aug. 4, 1972). 
68. See Hearings on H.R. 14567, H.R. 14826 and S. 3876 Before the Subcomm. on 
Commerce and Finance of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 92d 
Cong., 2d Sess. 133-35 (1972). 
69. H.R. 16946, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972). 
70. 118 CONG. REc. H9936 (daily ed. Oct. 13, 1972). 
71. BNA SEC. REG. & L. REP. No. 176, at B-4 (Nov. 8, 1972). 
72. See S. 2058, pas.sed by the Senate, Aug. 1, 1973, in 119 CoNG. REc. S15421 (daily ed. 
Aug. 1, 1973). See generally Hearings on S. 2058 Before the Subcomm. on Securities of 
the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). 
The matter now lies at the disposal of the House of Representatives, which may delay 
action in this area until the comprehensive bill resulting from the House subcommit• 
tee's study (H.R. 5050, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973)) is reported out of the full committee. 
73. BNA SEc. REG. & L. REP. No. 176, at B-3 (Nov. 8, 1972). 
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means of settlement between broker-dealers. 74 Although the certificate 
/ 
is only part of the paperwork problem in processing trades, it is a 
central part, and its elimination would vastly simplify the trans-
fer of ownership. Pending the elimination of the certificate itself, 
the flow of paper has already been substantially reduced through 
increased use of depositories and uniform forms for transfer, re-
clamation, delivery, and comparison.75 
D. Higher Standards for Entry into the the Securities Business 
A study of the firms that failed during the 1967-1970 crisis indi-
cated that, in many instances, failure might have been avoided if 
there had been stricter requirements for entry into the securities 
business. The examinations required for principals wishing to enter 
the business were too easily passed,76 as were the examinations for 
74. SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 40 (setting a deadline of December 31, 1976); 
HousE REPORT, supra note 4, at 70. Both reports also advocated the elimination of state 
transfer taxes so as to exempt transactions occurring outside a state from such taxes 
where only the deposit into or withdrawal from a depository or transfer by bookkeeping 
entry takes place within that state. SENATE REPORT, supra, at 40; HOUSE REPORT, supra, 
at 74. Both subcommittees recommended the establishment of a National Commission 
on Uniform Securities Laws to assist the states in modernizing their laws to facilitate 
more efficient methods of transferring securities. SENATE REPORT, supra, at 41; HousE 
REPORT, supra, at 75. Both reports directed the SEC to study the practice of registering 
securities in a "street name" (registration under a "street name" occurs when a broker 
holds securities in his name, even though they are actually owned by his customers) to 
determine whether and what steps can be taken to facilitate communications between 
corporations and their shareholders, with particular reference to the problems pre-
sented by the holding of "street name" certificates in depositories. SENATE REPORT, 
supra, at 40; HousE REPORT, supra, at 73-74. The House Report also contained a recom-
mendation directed to combining the functions of registrar and transfer agent. HouSE 
REPORT, supra, at 73. For a bill incorporating these recommendations, see H.R. 5050, 
93d Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 404, 406-08 (1973). 
For a proposed amendment to the Model Business Corporation Act to facilitate 
direct communication between a corporation and beneficial owners where shares are 
held in "street name," see Sebring, Proposed Changes in the Model Business Corpora-
tion Act, 28 Bus. LAw. 329 (1973). 
75. Uniform forms have now been adopted. See HousE REPORT, supra note 4, at 67 
n.28. The Depository Trust Company (formerly known as the Central Certificate Serv-
ice), organized by the NYSE, has now established regional depositories in more than 
ten states. BNA SEC. REG. & L. REP. No. 210, at A-13 Guly 11, 1973); BNA SEC. REG & 
L. REP. No. 187, at A-13 Gan. 31, 1973). During 1972 alone a total of 160 billion dollars 
in shares were transferred by simple computer entry on the records of the Depository 
Trust Company. BNA SEc. REG. & L. REP. No. 191, at A-13 (Feb. 28, 1973). The Mid-
west Stock Exchange has also formed a depository trust company. BNA SEc. REG. & 1:,. 
REP. No. 204, at A-11 (May 30, 1973). Although the Pacific Coast Stock Exchange has 
maintained a depository facility, recent financial problems incurred in operating it 
have resulted in a proposal to sell a 50 per cent interest in the depository to a con-
sortium of four major California banks. Wall St. J., Aug. 2, 1973, at 2, col. 3 (midwest 
ed.). For a critique of the effectiveness of the depository system, see Comment, Compre-
hensive Depository Systems and the Beneficial Owner, 20 UCLA L. REv. 848 (1972). 
76. See STAFF OF THE SPECIAL SUBCOMM. ON !NVESI1GATIONS OF THE HOUSE CoMM. ON 
INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 92D CONG., 1ST. SEss., REvmw OF SEC RECORDS OF 
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those who wished to be registered representatives. This is another 
area in which the House subcommittee desired uniformity. Accord-
ingly, it recommended that the SEC be given the clear authority 
and responsibility to develop a comprehensive broker-dealer exam-
ination program, including questions on bookkeeping, accounting, 
internal control of cash and securities, supervision of employees, 
maintenance of records, and general firm management.77 Under 
these recommendations the SEC would be given similar authority to 
develop uniform minimum age and experience qualifications for 
principals, taking into account different classifications of broker-
dealers.78 As with the net capital rule, the SEC's requirements would 
establish minimum standards for all broker-dealers, and the ex-
changes or the NASD would be free to adopt stricter requirements.79 
The House subcommittee also recommended (I) more frequent 
inspections of broker-dealers by the SEC or appropriate self-regula-
tory organizations, with mandatory inspections of newly registered 
broker-dealers within the first six months of their entry into business; 
(2) a requirement that certified financial statements accompany ap-
plications for registration as a broker-dealer; (3) broader statutory 
grounds for disqualification of applicants, including disqualifica-
tion for conviction for serious criminal offenses, such as grand 
larceny; (4) a requirement of affirmative SEC action on applications 
for registration as a broker-dealer, to obviate the possibility that 
registration applications might become effective by default; and 
(5) confirmation of the SEC's power to refuse registration when a 
person in a control relationship to the applicant is the subject of 
pending disciplinary proceedings.80 
'rHL DEMISE OF SELECTED BROKER-DEALERS 23-26 (Comm. Print 1971) [hereinafter REVIEW 
OF SEC REcoRDs]. See also House Hearings, supra note 5, pt. 1, at 125-28. 
77. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 4, at 22. 
78. Id. at 22-23. For a particularly distressing illustration of how a brokerage busi-
ness can fail quickly when run by inexperienced persons, see REVIEW OF SEC REcoRDs, 
suj>ra note 76, at 110-18; House Hearings, supra note 5, pt. 1, at 124-25 (Broker-dealer 
registration was granted to a Harvard law student who had very limited experience in 
the brokerage business and "practically no knowledge of accounting." The firm com-
piled an extensive record of violations of the SEC bookkeeping requirements and also 
of the Federal Reserve Board's Regulation T (margin regulations) before becoming 
insolvent and being enjoined from conducting further business. At one time the 
registrant had bank overdrafts of 364,000 dollars, and, at the time of insolvency, it had 
in its possession 50,000 dollars or more in securities, the owners of which could not be 
identified.). 
79. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 4, at 23. 
80. Id. at 21-24. The last of these recommendations resulted from a finding that, 
pending an SEC investigation or disciplinary proceeding against a broker-dealer, it is 
"not uncommon" for the broker-dealer to form and register another entity. See SEC 
UNSAFE AND UNSOUND PRACI'ICES STUDY, supra note 10, at 163-64. Under such circum-
stances the SEC's only remedy is apparently to institute a separate proceeding against 
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In contrast to the House subcommittee's approach, the Senate 
subcommittee recommended that "only minimum necessary entry 
requirements'' be imposed by federal statutes.81 Although recogniz-
ing that the probability of failure is higher among newly formed 
firms with limited capital than among older, more experienced 
firms, the Senate subcommittee observed that "the failure of large, 
established firms ... posed the greatest threat to customers and the:: 
industry" during the crisis period of 1968-1970.82 It saw the "healthy 
injection of competition" provided by new entries into the broker-
age business as "the best and most effective regulator of brokers and 
dealers."83 
On closer inspection the recommendations of the House sub-
committee are not inconsistent with the over-all objective of the 
Senate subcommittee to provide a "healthy injection of competition 
into the industry." The House subcommittee's concern was to ensure 
that competition was indeed healthy, supplied by well-managed firms 
staffed by qualified persons. Thus, the proposed reforms seem con-
sonant with a goal of encouraging free, responsible entry into the 
brokerage business. This conclusion is reinforced by the recent de-
cision of the NASD to form a committee to develop stricter entry 
requirements. The NASD has expressed its concern that sixty-
three of the sixty-eight liquidations effected under the SIPC pro-
cedure during the past two years have involved N ASD firms that 
were not members of any exchange. During the same period, an 
additional 109 NASD firms voluntarily ceased doing business. Some 
of the liquidations involved fraudulent practices. From the sixty-
three firms liquidated by SIPC, eighty persons who served as prin-
cipals are now back in business, and principals of some firms have 
been involved in more than one liquidation. Of the NASD members 
liquidated by SIPC, eighty-five per cent had been in business less 
than five years and had capitalization of less than 100,000 dollars.84 
E. Uniformity in Accounting and Auditing Procedures 
Although some changes are taking place in the accounting pro-
fession, there is still widespread dissatisfaction with the over-all lack 
the new entity, which might in turn lead to the formation of yet another registrant. 
See Jaffee & Co. v. SEC, 446 F.2d 387 (2d Cir. 1971). For several illustrative cases, see 
REvmw OF SEC REcoRDs, supra note 76, at 21-22. The House subcommittee implemented 
these recommendations in H.R. 5050, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 303 (1973). 
81. SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 37. 
82. Id. 
83. Id. 
84. See Wall St. J., March 13, 1973, at 2, col. 3 (midwest ed.). 
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of uniformity in accounting standards. In this respect the brokerage 
community is not alone, although it also has some unique problems. 
Hearings held by the House subcommittee disclosed that two differ-
ent accounting firms could reach different conclusions in the audit 
of one broker-dealer, although both firms might be following "gen-
erally accepted accounting principles."85 The subcommittee recom-
mended that the SEC require uniformity in accounting procedures, 
as well as in "accounting principles," no later than January l, 1974.86 
Although exchange spokesmen argued that achieving such uniformity 
would be both costly and disruptive to broker-dealers,87 the subcom-
mittee concluded that lack of uniformity in procedures, if allowed 
to continue, would entail much higher costs in terms of potential 
customer losses and that any disruption resulting from a uniformity 
requirement would be justified by the improvements in financial 
reporting that would resu1t.ss 
As to audit procedures, the House subcommittee recommended 
abandonment of the surprise audit in favor of regular annual or 
fiscal-year audits of broker-dealer firms.89 Although surprise audits 
were thought to have some value if they reduce the opportunity for 
a broker-dealer to engage in transactions that improperly enhance 
its financial position at the audit date,90 it was evident from the sub-
committee's hearings that, particularly in the case of large broker-
dealers with many customer accounts, firms frequently had several 
days' advance notice of an impending "surprise" audit.91 In addition, 
85. House Hearings, supra note 5, pt. 2, at 1058-59. An example is provided by a 
case study of a NYSE member. The study, conducted by a NYSE examiner, indicated 
that, as of November 30, 1968, there were at least eight possible computations for the 
firm's net capital ratio, depending upon varying treatment given to such items as short 
stock differences, suspense accounts, and fails to deliver. See REVIEW OF SEC REcoRDs, 
supra note 76, at 76-77. 
86. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 4, at 49-50. Accounting "procedures" (in contrast to 
accounting "principles") "prescribe in a definitive manner how transactions and other 
events should be recorded, classified, summarized and presented and are the means for 
implementing ••• [accounting] principles." Id. at 49. Thus, implementation of uniform 
accounting procedures would entail prescribing a uniform system of accounts for all 
broker-dealers. 
87. See House Hearings, supra note 5, pt. 2, at 997, 1010, 1025. Greater uniformity 
in reporting procedures (rather than in accounting procedures) was urged as an alter-
native approach. This would presumably entail uniform interpretations of the specific 
items required by the various report forms. See, e.g., id. at 1010 (statement of panelists 
from the NYSE), 1026 (statement of Andrew Barr, chief accountant, SEC). 
88. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 4, at 50. 
89. Id. at 54-55. 
90. See Wall St. J., Dec. 5, 1972, at 3, col. 2 (midwest ed.). 
91. See Report from David Clurman, Assistant Attorney General, to the Attorney 
General of the State of New York, entitled A Report on the Auditors of Wall Street 
(undated), reprinted in House Hearings, supra note 5, pt. 2, at 1091, 1095-99. 
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since the very essence of a surprise audit is that it be made at irregu-
lar intervals, the procedure prevented comparisons of a firm's oper-
ating results from one year to another through income statements 
for comparable reporting periods. After receiving the House sub-
committee's recommendations, the SEC did not object to the pro-
posed abandonment of the surprise audit requirements by the 
Pacific Coast and Midwest Stock Exchanges. 02 The NYSE has pro-
posed that surprise audits be made optional with its member firms, 
and the SEC has concurred in that proposal.03 It is unlikely, how-
ever, that the House subcommittee will be satisfied with anything 
less than a complete elimination of the surprise audit. Thus, if the 
SEC fails to require this, legislation may be expected. 
Among the other recommendations of the House subcommittee 
concerning accounting and auditing were (I) broadening the SEC's 
authority to require greater uniformity in reporting by broker-
dealers, thus reducing the number and variety of reports and the 
paperwork involved in preparing them, (2) directing the SEC to 
broaden its rules relating to disclosure by broker-dealers of their 
financial condition to customers, and (3) reducing or eliminating 
redundancy in broker-dealer examination procedures, with one 
agency conducting such examinations, and the SEC establishing 
uniform guidelines and standards to minimize differences in rules, 
interpretations, and standards.04 
III. SELF-REGULATION 
After the financial crisis of the late 1960's, there was a serious 
question whether the system of self-regulation under which the se-
curities industry had traditionally operated was still viable. Certainly 
92. Wall Street J., Dec. 5, 1972, at 3, col. 2 (midwest ed.). 
93. Id.; HousE REPORT, supra note 4, at 54 n.16. See also SEC Securities Exchange Act 
Release No. 10297 (July 25, 1973), 38 Fed. Reg. 20904 (1973), proposing amendments to 
SEC Rule 17a-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-5 (1973), and Form X-17A-5, 17 C.F.R. § 249.617 
(1973), to permit independent public accountants "to perform audit procedures prior 
to the audit or balance sheet date of the broker or dealer.'' BNA SF.c. REG. & L. REP. 
No. 213, at A-11, F-1 to -3 (Aug. 1, 1973). The change was prompted by the NYSE's 
proposal to eliminate the surprise audit requirement for its member firms. The SEC 
pointed out that "[t]o date all the major exchanges, with the exception of the NYSE 
and the AMEX have made the surprise audit requirement optional for their members." 
In proposing the change, the SEC pointed out that the independent accountant would 
not be precluded from performing procedures on a surprise basis when, in his judg-
ment, they are appropriate. The SEC has now adopted the foregoing proposals. SEC 
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 10398. BNA SEC. REG. &: L. REP. No. 220, at G-1 
(Sept. 26, 1973). 
94. HouSE REPORT, supra note 4, at 50-57. For a recent SEC Advisory Committee 
report also recommending greater uniformity in reporting forms, see BNA SEC. REG. & 
L. REP. No. 182, at 1-1 (Dec. 20, 1972). 
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the performance of the self-regulatory bodies in enforcing their 
rules in areas such as net capital, regulation of specialists, and the 
whole system of insuring broker-dealer financial stability by periodic 
examinations and uniform accounting principles and procedures 
left much to be desired.95 An alternative to self-regulation might be 
some form of pervasive, direct federal control, through a drastic 
broadening of the powers of the SEC or other federal agencies. Both 
congressional subcommittees carefully considered the problem and 
concluded that, although self-regulation should be retained, it should 
be strengthened and made more responsive to the needs of the 
public.00 Reforms that increased the number of "public" directors 
of the major stock exchanges to ten (out of a total of twenty-one 
directors)97 are certainly consistent with the concept that the ex-
changes can no longer be considered to be private clubs that provide 
a trading monopoly to only a relative few. 
But the House subcommittee was not content with recent re-
forms made by the exchanges. For example, it criticized the NYSE's 
failure to follow the recommendations of the Martin Report98 as to 
the method of choosing public directors.99 Under the Martin Report, 
the public directors, although initially chosen by a nominating com-
mittee of seven public representatives appointed by the Board of 
Governors (and then voted upon by the membership), would there-
after elect their successors in order to assure their continuing inde-
pendence.100 Under the proposals eventually adopted by the NYSE, 
the public, as well as other directors would continue to be elected by 
95. A particularly extensive examination of the effectiveness of self-regulation during 
the crisis period was conducted by the Senate Securities Industry Study. See Case Study, 
supra note 31; Senate Hearings, supra note 31, pt. 4, at 1-213. See also HousE REPORT, 
supra note 4, at 92-100. 
96. See generally HouSE REPORT, supra note 4, at 100-08. The House subcommittee 
suggested that the phrase "self-regulation" be replaced by the term "cooperative regu-
lation," to describe more accurately the proper role of the exchanges and the NASD 
vis-a-vis the SEC and the Congress. See HousE REPORT, supra note 4, at 85. The term 
WaJ first used in the Senate Report accompanying the Maloney Act. S. REP. No. 1455, 
75th Cong., !ld Sess. !l-4 (1938). The Senate subcommittee's most recent report conceded 
that the term "self-regulation" should be discarded if it is misleading, but it suggested 
that care be exercised "lest the use of phrases such as 'partnership' and 'cooperative 
regulation' lead to the impression that the industry and the government fulfill the 
same function in the regulatory framework or that they enjoy the same order of author-
ity or deserve the same degree of deference, whether by firms, courts or the Congress." 
SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 147. 
97. NYSE Const. art. II, 2 CCH NYSE GUIDE ,I 1051 (1972); AMEX Const. art. II, 
§ I, 2 CCH AMEX GUIDE ,I 9011 (1972). 
98. See note 25 supra. 
99. See HouSE REPORT, supra note 4, at 106-07. 
100. Martin Report, supra note 25, at 3196-97. 
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the Exchange membership.101 This may cause the public directors to 
oe less responsive to or representative of the public than they might 
have been under the Martin Report proposals.102 In addition, Martin 
called for rather extensive reforms to align voting power on the Ex-
change more closely with the legal responsibilities and economic 
significance of member firms. Under his proposals each existing seat 
would be converted into ten shares, with one vote per share, but ten 
shares would be required to enable a firm to place a representative 
on the Exchange floor or to be a clearing member.103 As far as voting 
power is concerned, share ownership would be limited in proportion 
to the amount of business done with the public.104 These proposals 
were not carried out in the reforms that the Exchange actually 
adopted. Instead, certain Exchange members not actually owning 
their seats were required to give irrevocable proxies to their firms, 
the true owners of the seats.105 As the House subcommittee pointed 
out, this did little to effectuate the more thoroughgoing reforms 
advocated by Mr. Martin.106 
The House subcommittee also recommended that public direc-
tors be compensated adequately for the time and responsibility that 
they devote to their tasks and that they be given appropriate staff 
support, including independent counsel, independent accounting 
assistance, and, when necessary, independent technical assistance. 
This would substantially increase the efficiency and value of the 
contribution of public directors and would reinforce their inde-
pendence.107 
Although the Senate subcommittee did not recommend imme-
diate endorsement of the Martin Report proposals concerning public 
directors and the reallocation of exchange seats, it did propose some 
relatively pervasive reforms in the procedures of self-regulatory or-
ganizations and in the powers and procedures of the SEC with respect 
to such organizations. First, although the Senate Report pointed out 
IOI. See NYSE Const. art. VII, § 10, 2 CCH NYSE GumE 1f 1310 (1972). 
102. See HouSE REPORT, supra note 4, at 106-07. For an indication that the public 
directors of the NYSE may be lacking in independence, see Wall St. J., Aug. 30, 1972, 
at 27, col. 3 (eastern ed.) (replies from several public directors to a letter of inquiry 
from the president of the National Shareholders Association appeared to be identical 
in wording and, in three instances, were signed and sent by exchange staff members 
"on behalf" of the public directors concerned). 
103. See Martin Report, supra note 25, at 3198-99. 
104. Id. at 3200. 
105. NYSE Const. art. VII,§ 11, 2 CCH NYSE GumE 1f 13Il (1972). 
106. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 4, at 106. 
107. Id. at 107. Essentially the same point was recently made by former Justice 
Arthur J. Goldberg when he resigned as a director of Trans World Airlines. See N.Y. 
Times, Oct. 29, 1972, § 3, at 3, cols. 2-3 (late city ed.). 
For legislative implementation of the House subcommittee's recommendations, see 
H.R. 5050, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 202, 206 (1973). 
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that many of the major exchanges have recently revised their rules 
to ensure that disciplinary proceedings are conducted with a greater 
measure of fairness,1°8 the Senate subcommittee recommended that 
the SEC be given authority to disapprove or modify exchange dis-
ciplinary procedures to assure continued compliance with due proc-
ess standards.109 In addition, the subcommittee endorsed the SEC's 
proposal that its review power over disciplinary proceedings, pres-
ently exercised only over NASD proceedings, be extended to include 
similar actions by exchanges. 110 Although the House subcommittee 
had also supported the SEC's suggestion that it be given power not 
only to review, but, in appropriate instances, to increase penalties 
imposed by exchanges in disciplinary proceedings,m the Senate 
subcommittee found little evidence of a present need for such addi-
tional SEC power. It pointed out that its investigations had not 
"disclosed serious problems with regard to self-regulatory agencies 
imposing inadequate penalties,"112 and it also seemed impressed with 
testimony from industry leaders that to give the SEC power to in-
crease penalties would weaken, rather than strengthen, self-regula-
tory disciplinary procedures.113 Finally, the Senate subcommittee en-
dorsed the recommendation of the SEC's Advisory Committee on 
Enforcement Policies and Practices114 that self-regulatory discipli-
nary proceedings be open to public scrutiny through more adequate 
publicity of findings of violations, sanctions imposed, and standards 
on which decisions are based.115 
108. SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 152 & n.18. 
109. Id. See also id. at 179. In a similar vein, the Senate subcommittee recommended 
amendments to the Securities Exchange Act that would impose procedural due process 
requirements on exchanges with regard to the denial of membership applications and 
impose on all self-regulatory organizations similar due process requirements relating to 
actions that might affect nonmembers. Id. at 154-55. 
llO. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 152, 179; SEC UNSAFE AND UNSOUND PRAC-
TICES STUDY, supra note 10, at 7. The same proposal had previously been endorsed by 
the House subcommittee. See HouSE REPORT, supra note 4, at 108-09. A bill was intro-
duced in the House of Representatives in June 1972 at the SEC's request to achieve 
these objectives. See H.R. 15303, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972). For the House subcom• 
mittee's views as to that legislation, see HousE REPORT, supra note 4, at 108-13. 
ll I. See SEC UNSAFE AND UNSOUND PRACTICES STUDY, supra note IO, at 7; HouSE 
REPORT, supra note 4, at Ill. 
112. Sr:NATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 179. 
113. Id. at 179-80, citing testimony in Senate Hearings, supra note 31, pt. 3, at 204, 
by the president of the American Stock Exchange, who said that giving the SEC power 
to increase penalties would tend to "fractionalize" responsibility and thus debilitate 
the self-regulatory process. This testimony was also relied on by the Senate subcommit-
tee in rejecting the SEC's proposal that it be given power to enforce directly the rules 
of the self-regulatory bodies. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 178. 
114. Securities & Exchange Commn., Report of the Advisory Committee on Enforce• 
ment Policies and Practices 60-61 Uune 1, 1972). 
115. SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 153. 
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Both subcommittees broadly supported the SEC's proposal to 
extend its authority over the adoption, alteration, or abrogation 
of rules by self-regulatory organizations.116 Presently there are curi-
ous gaps in the extent of the SEC's powers over such organizations. 
For example, although the SEC has relatively broad powers over 
the licensing of exchanges,117 its power to alter or supplement ex-
change rules is narrowly circumscribed as to subject matter, and the 
procedure for SEC modification of an exchange rule is relatively 
cumbersome.118 Furthermore, although the SEC has by rule required 
exchanges to file reports of proposed rule changes, an exchange 
rule may be validly adopted notwithstanding a failure to file an 
appropriate report,119 and, even when an exchange files a report of 
a proposed rule change, the SEC takes the position that it need not 
act affirmatively120 but may merely indicate, often informally, that 
it has no objections to the proposed rule. As a result, the SEC may 
not learn of proposed rule changes by the exchanges in time to en-
sure an adequate review.121 The often perfunctory review can present 
substantial difficulties for parties appealing the rule change in the 
courts, since the record of administrative review is sparse. Moreover, 
the SEC generally asserts that its failure to disapprove does not 
constitute an order; thus, its inaction is not subject to judicial 
scrutiny.122 As a result of this inability to obtain direct review, ex-
change rules are frequently exposed to collateral attack in the courts 
116. Id. at 172-75; HousE REPORT, supra note 4, at 108-10. 
117. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 6, 15 U.S.C. § 78f (1970). 
118. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 19(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b) (1970). 
119. 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-8(d) (1973). 
120. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 199-200. 
121. An example might be the manner in which the question of incorporating the 
NYSE was handled. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 172-74; House Hearings, supra 
note 5, pt. 3, at 1752-86. 
122. For an extensive discussion, see SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 208-10. Only 
SEC "orders" are subject to review in the circuit courts of appeal under section 25(a) 
of the Securities Exchange Act. 15 U.S.C. § 78y(a) (1970). However, as the Senate report 
indicates, the federal district courts have additional powers to review SEC action under 
the Administrative Procedure Act. 5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 704 (1970). See Independent Broker-
Dealers' Trade Assn. v. SEC, 442 F. 2d 132 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 828 
(1971). For cases illustrating the difficulty of obtaining review of SEC "non-disapproval" 
or inaction, see Independent Investor Protective League v. SEC, BNA SEC. REG. & L. 
REP. No. 131, at A-12 (2d Cir. 1971); Project on Corporate Responsibilty v. SEC, 
[1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 1[ 93,783 (D.C. Cir. 1972). The latter 
holding cast doubt on the continuing vitality of Medical Comm. for Human Rights v. 
SEC, 432 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1970), vacated as moot, 404 U.S. 403 (1972), which had 
held that the SEC's failure to object to a company's omission of a shareholder proposal 
under rule 14a-8 (17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (1973)) was reviewable even though it was not 
technically in the form of an SEC "order." For additional discussion, see 3 L. Loss, 
SECURITIES REGULATION 1926 (2d ed. 1961). 
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under the antitrust laws.123 Finally, changes in interpretations of 
exchange rules (as opposed to changes in the rules themselves) are 
entirely free from SEC scrutiny. Indeed, a substantial change in the 
effect of a rule can be implemented under the guise of an interpretation 
without the SEC's knowledge (much less its "non-disapproval").124 
The same problems exist, to a somewhat lesser extent, in regard 
to SEC power over the rules of the NASD. Although the Securities 
Exchange Act requires the NASD to file copies of changes in, or 
additions to, rules with the SEC, such changes take effect automati-
cally thirty days after filing unless the SEC enters an order disap-
proving the change or addition.125 The SEC is required to disap-
prove the change or addition if it is inconsistent with the statutory 
prerequisites for registration of a national securities association.126 
As already mentioned, a rule may undergo a covert change through 
the guise of a new interpretation without triggering the filing re-
quirements. Finally, the SEC's power to alter or supplement rules 
of a national securities association is confined by statute to rela-
tively procedural matters,127 although it does have the power to 
abrogate such rules entirely if this is necessary to ensure fair dealing 
and to protect investors.128 
To ensure that the SEC would have enough information for an 
adequate review of rule changes under its expanded powers, the 
Senate subcommittee advocated a statutory requirement that self-
regulatory organizations file with any proposed change a "concise 
general statement of its basis and purpose."129 Although the subcom-
mittee did not suggest that the SEC review procedure involve the 
formal adversary proceedings appropriate to the issuance of SEC 
orders, it did set forth minimum standards to be observed irrespec-
tive of the technical format of review: 
[T]he new procedure should (I) provide interested persons the 
opportunity to present data, views, arguments, and rebuttal evidence 
123. See, e.g., Silver v. NYSE, 373 U.S. 341 (1963). See also SENATE REPORT, supra 
note 4, at 212-13. 
124. See, e.g., text accompanying notes 32-35 supra. 
125. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 15A(j), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(j) (1970). 
126. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 15A(j), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(j) (1970). See also 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 15A(b), (d), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o-3(b), (d) (1970). 
127. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 15A(k)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(k)(2) (1970). 
128. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 15A(k)(l), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(k)(l) (1970). 
129. SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 156. See also id. at 201, 215-18. The subcom-
mittee indicated that such statements should be similar to those required for rule-
making under section 4(b) of the Administrative Procedure Act. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) 
(1970). 
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both orally and by written submission; (2) require the Commission 
to make specific findings and conclusions as to the necessity or appro-
priateness of the disapproval or alteration of the rule; (3) provide 
any person adversely affected a clear and expeditious means to obtain 
judicial review; and (4) require that the Commission's action be 
reversed if it is not supported by substantial evidence on the record 
taken as a whole.1so 
The House and Senate subcommittees differed with respect to 
the SEC's proposal to extend its authority to permit it to enforce 
the rules of self-regulatory organizations directly. Although the 
House subcommittee thought that the SEC might, by implication, 
already have direct enforcement authority with regard to self-regu-
latory rules, it agreed with "the utility of making the authority ex-
plicit."131 The Senate subcommittee, on the other hand, found that 
deficiencies in the functioning of the self-regulatory system could be 
attributed more frequently to the SEC's failure to use its existing 
powers than to a lack of power to enforce self-regulatory rules 
directly.132 In view of the possible adverse effects of further exten-
sions of the SEC's powers,183 the Senate subcommittee deferred any 
recommendation until receipt from the SEC of additional data as to 
specific "experienced needs" for such authority.134 
The Senate subcommittee's case study of the SEC and exchange 
decisions involved in permitting members of the NYSE and Midwest 
Stock Exchange to engage in selling life insurance indicated the need 
for a clearer definition of the scope of exchange and NASD author-
ity over their members and, in turn, of the scope of the SEC's obli-
gations to supervise those self-regulatory organizations.1811 The SEC 
had sought to justify its relatively "passive and noncommittal atti-
130. SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 176-77. The report also advocated that all 
comments and correspondence between the SEC and a self-regulatory organization 
concerning a proposed rule or rule change be made publicly available. Where funda-
mental policy issues are involved, public hearings or publicly announced conferences 
should be provided and the SEC should consider reviewing the particular proposal "on 
the record," thereby placing the burden of justification on the proponents of the rule 
and affording others significantly affected by the rule change the right to cross-examine 
and submit rebuttal evidence. Id. at 198-99. 
131. HouSE REPORT, supra note 4, at Ill. For the legislative implementation of this 
recommendation, see H.R. 5050, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 208, 210 (1973). See also DawidofI, 
The Power of the Securities and Exchange Commission to Require Stock Exchanges to 
Discipline Members, 41 FORDHAM L. REv. 549 (1973) (favoring the position taken by the 
House subcommittee). 
132. SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 177-79. 
133. Id. at 178. See note 113 supra. 
134. SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 179. 
135. See Staff Study of the Decisions Involved in Permitting Member Organizations 
of the New York and Midwest Stock Exchanges to Sell Life Insurance, in Senate Hear• 
ings, supra note 31, at 82-95. 
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tude" toward the question of life insurance sales by what it believed 
to be limitations on its regulatory authority contained in the Mc-
Carran-Ferguson Act of 1945.136 Without seeking to decide whether 
the SEC was precluded from regulating broker-dealer sales of life 
insurance, the Senate subcommittee concluded that if the SEC has 
no regulatory authority in an area, the exchanges could have no 
power to authorize member activity in that area, for the powers of 
exchanges consist exclusively of those delegated to them by federal 
law.137 To clarify the matter further, the subcommittee suggested 
that the Securities Exchange Act be amended to limit the scope of a 
self-regulatory organization's authority over its members to "securi-
ties related activities and to those aspects of their other activities, 
e.g., financial arrangements, which may pose dangers to public 
securities investors or to the public's confidence in the integrity of 
the securities markets."138 Similarly, the Securities Exchange Act 
would be amended to "make explicit that the Commission's over-
sight authority encompasses all uses of self-regulatory power."139 
Finally, viewing the distribution of regulatory power from a 
broader perspective, the Senate subcommittee advocated "a major 
rearrangement of the regulatory structure of the securities industry 
to meet the needs of the new central market system."140 The chair-
man of the Securities Industry Association has similarly suggested 
that self-regulatory activities be restructured on the basis of function 
rather than firm membership, dividing self-regulation into two 
major areas: (I) regulation of trading and markets, and (2) regula-
tion of firm and capital requirements.141 Under the Senate subcom-
mittee's proposal, the role of the exchanges would be narrowed 
somewhat to include primarily the regulation of member firms' 
activities in trading on exchanges or on any central market facility 
that might be developed. The NASD's regulatory role would be ex-
panded to include all other activities of member firms in dealing 
with public customers, including selling practices, financial responsi-
bility requirements, competence of personnel, and similar matters.142 
The House subcommittee's report contained detailed recom-
136. Senate Hearings, supra note 31, pt. 3, at 98 (testimony of SEC Commissioner 
Philip A. Loomis, Jr.). See 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1970). 
137. SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 162. 
lllS. Id. at 163. 
139. Id. 
140. Id. at 168. 
141. Address by Robert M. Gardiner, First Annual Conference, SIA Mid-Continental 
District 12-14, March 8, 1972, quoted in SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 167-68. 
142. SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 168-69. 
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mendations aimed at strengthening the SEC's independence from 
the executive branch of the government and increasing its re-
sources.143 As a statutory creature, the SEC should be primarily 
accountable to Congress, not to the executive branch, although all 
five SEC commissioners are appointed by the President with the 
advice and consent of the Senate.144 A primary area of Congressional 
control over the SEC has always been its power to review SEC 
budgetary requests, but that power has been hampered by directions 
that the SEC, along with other governmental agencies, submit its 
budgetary requests to the Office of Management and Budget (0MB) 
prior to passing them on to Congress.1415 Thus, Congress has gen-
erally seen budgetary requests only after they have been approved 
and, if need be, modified by the 0MB; it does not see the submis-
sion originally made to the 0MB by the SEC. This procedure not 
only deprives Congress of information that is useful in considering 
the budgetary needs of the SEC, but it is also inconsistent with the 
proposition that the SEC is, in a very real sense, an administrative 
branch of Congress and not part of the executive branch of the 
government.146 Even though there may be a need to correlate the 
budgetary requests of the SEC and other independent regulatory 
agencies with those of the various executive departments, Congress 
should not be precluded from obtaining from the SEC all the in-
formation concerning its budgetary needs that the SEC submitted 
initially to the 0MB. The House subcommittee has proposed that, 
whenever the SEC submits any budget estimate or request to the 
President or to the 0MB, it shall concurrently transmit a copy of 
that estimate or request to Congress.147 
143. See HouSE REPORT, supra note 4, at 114-15. 
144. For a good discussion of the SEC's independence, see ·w. CARY, PoLmcs AND THE 
REGULATORY AGENCIES 9-26 (1967), where it is noted that in addition to the potential 
threat of a Commissioner's removal, a substantial threat to SEC independence is the 
White House's control over budgetary policies. Id. at 12. See also 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINIS-
TRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 1.03, at 21 n.17 (1958). 
145. 31 U.S.C. §§ 23-24 (1970). See also House Hearings, supra note 5, pt. 3, at 
1800-01. 
146. Professor (former SEC Chairman) Cary has pointed out that the House Inter-
state and Foreign Commerce Committee takes its oversight responsibilities particularly 
seriously. This attitude is said to stem back to the view of former House Speaker Sam 
Rayburn who regarded the SEC as "one of his own progeny." W. CARY, supra note 144, 
at 104-05. In view of this it is not at all surprising that the current proposals to 
strengthen the independence of the SEC from the executive branch in these respects 
have originated from the House subcommittee rather than from its Senate counterpart. 
147. See HouSE REPORT, supra note 4, at 114; H.R. 5050, 93d Cong. 1st Sess. § IOI 
(1973). The House bill also provides that "any Commissioner may be removed by the 
President for neglect of duty or malfeasance in office, but for no other cause." H.R. 
5050, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § IOI (1973), amending Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 4(a), 
15 U.S.C. ~ 78d(a) (1970). In addition, once a Commissioqer has been appointed to 
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In a similar vein, under questionable statutory authority the 
SEC and other such agencies have customarily been required to 
clear proposed legislation, and even proposed testimony by agency 
officials before congressional bodies, with the 0MB prior to submis-
sion to Congress.148 It is crucial that Congress receive testimony 
and legislative proposals directly from the SEC prior to their trans-
mission to the 01\IB, the President, or any other official of the ex-
ecutive branch. Unlike budgetary considerations, SEC legislative 
proposals need not be correlated with similar requests by other gov-
ernmental agencies. Indeed, the President's potential veto power 
over SEC legislative proposals and testimony ( exercised through the 
0MB) constitutes a serious interference with the power and duty of 
CongTess to exercise continuing oversight of the SEC and other 
independent regulatory agencies. The House subcommittee proposes 
to require the SEC to transmit to Congress all proposed legis-
lation and all congressional testimony in advance of or simulta-
neously with submission of such material to the OMB.149 The pro-
posed requirement deprives any "officer or agency of the United 
States" of the power to require the SEC to submit legislative recom-
mendations, testimony, or comments on legislation prior to submis-
sion to Congress.um If the SEC should voluntarily seek to obtain 
the comments or review of "any agency of the United States or of 
any other person," it shall "include a description of such actions 
in its legislative recommendations, testimony, or comments on legis-
lation which it transmits to the Congress."151 
Just as the 0MB has acted as a screening device for SEC budget-
ary and legislative proposals, the Office of the Solicitor General has 
exercised a similar prerogative with respect to litigation that the 
SEC proposes to bring before the Supreme Court of the United 
States.1112 Although the Solicitor General has testified that this pro-
serve as Chairman, he may not be demoted until the expiration of his term as Com• 
missioner. If adopted this would remove another potential Presidential control over 
SEC Chairmen and Commissioners. For discussion of the removal and demotion powers 
under the existing statute, see ·w. CARY, supra note 144, at 9-10. As Professor Cary 
points out, the powers have been infrequently exercised but the potential exists as a 
threat to independence. 
148. For an extensive discussion, see House Hearings, supra note 5, pt. 3, at 1800-09. 
For the OMB's asserted statutory basis for its jurisdiction in these respects, see id. at 
1808-09. The House subcommittee concluded that "the requirement of Executive clear-
ance has evolved without statutory basis." HousE REPORT, supra note 4, at 114. 
149. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 4, at 114. 
150. H.R. 5050, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § IOI (1973). 
151. H.R. 5050, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § IOI (1973). See also H.R. 4036, 93d Cong .• 
1st Sess. (1973), which similarly clarifies congressional authority over all seven inde-
pendent regulatory agencies, including the SEC. 
152. See HouSE Rl':PORT, supra note 4, at 114-15, 
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cedure is not only proper, but crucial to the maintenance of the 
strength and stature of the government's posture in Supreme Court 
litigation,153 there is a substantial risk that SEC views and argu-
ments that happen to be unpopular with persons in the executive 
branch of the government may be screened out in advance. The SEC 
should be given the independence to conduct its mm litigation 
before the Supreme Court, with the assistance, if need be, of the 
Solicitor General.154 
Finally, the House subcommittee's proposed legislation contains 
a powerful mandate to prevent the SEC from transferring docu-
ments "in its possession or under its control to any other agency or 
to any person" without retaining copies of the material in question 
or imposing conditions that ensure that the material will be returned 
and submitted to Congress if requested.155 This was added in re-
sponse to an alleged attempt by the SEC to preclude various con-
gressional committees from obtaining documents pertaining to an 
SEC investigation of the International Telephone and Telegraph 
Corporation. Allegedly at the suggestion of former Presidential 
Counsel John W. Dean, the SEC had transferred custody of the 
documents to the Justice Department.156 
153. See BNA SEC, REG. & L. REP. No. 206, at A-20 (June 13, 1973) (account of testi-
mony of Envin N. Griswold before the House Subcommittee on Commerce and Fi-
nance). The former Solicitor General testified that the effect of the House subcom-
mittee's bill might be to cause the Court to take a more skeptical attitude towards SEC 
requests for judicial review. Under the present scheme, when judicial review in an 
SEC case is sought by the Solicitor General, the Court may have greater confidence that 
the case is one where Supreme Court review is appropriate. For a contrary argument, 
see id. at A-21 (testimony of Prof. Roy A. Schotland, who had acted as a special con-
sultant to the House subcommittee in connection with the preparation of its recom-
mendations and report). 
154. HouSE REPORT, supra note 4, at 114-15. Such a change is proposed in H.R. 
5050, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § IOI (1973). 
155. H.R. 5050, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § IOI (1973). 
156. For an account of the ITT affair and the reaction of the House subcommittee, 
see N.Y. Times, June 7, 1973, at I, cols. 2-3 (city ed.); Wall St. J., June 8, 1973, at 4, 
col. 2 (midwest ed.). As the latter report indicates, the incident drew the attention of 
Representative Harley 0. Staggers, Chairman of the Interstate and Foreign Commerce 
Committee (parent to the House Subcommittee on Commerce and Finance). Represent-
ative Staggers, as Chairman of the House Special Subcommittee on Investigations, is 
conducting a further inquiry into the handling of the matter, as well as into broader 
areas pertaining to the SEC's enforcement of the securities laws. See BNA SEc. REG. & 
L. REP. No. 209, at A-12 (July 4, 1973). Interest in the ITT matter was heightened 
further by recent disclosures before the Senate Select Committee on Presidential Cam-
paign Activities of a memorandum, written in March 1972 by Charles Colson, then 
special counsel to the President, to then White House Chief of Staff H. R. Haldeman 
urging the withdrawal of the nomination of Richard Kleindienst as Attorney General 
because of "the possibility of serious additional exposure" in the course of confirma-
tion hearings then being conducted on Mr. Kleindienst by the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee. The memorandum presumably outlined the existence of documents that would 
link high administration officials to the Justice Department's settlement in 1971 of its 
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IV. CHANGES IN THE STRUCTURE OF THE MARKET 
The problem of commission rates is at the center of the entire 
controversy about the desirability and form of a national or central 
market system and the qualifications for access to that system. Re-
duced to its simplest terms, the question is one of who is to pay the 
cost, and who is to receive the profits, of securities transactions. In-
stitutional investors, who are responsible for an increasing percent-
age of dollar and share volume of trading on national securities 
markets,1117 have become unwilling to pay commissions that are dis-
proportionate to the value of the services they receive. Institutions 
generally trade in relatively large blocks of stock,1118 but until re-
cently the NYSE's commission rate structure did not provide for a 
wholesale rate for large transactions. For instance, until 1968, the 
commission rate charged by a broker-dealer for executing a trans-
action of 100,000 shares was 1,000 times greater than the commission 
on a round lot of l 00 shares, even though the average cost of 
handling the larger order (assuming a trade in a stock selling for 
forty dollars per share) was only approximately 377 times as great.159 
The response of institutions to this situation was to devise 
methods, some of them highly ingenious, to recoup part of the ex-
cessive commissions. Despite the NYSE's ban on rebates or dis-
counts,160 commission sharing between member firms was permitted; 
thus, a customer might instruct one member firm to give up part of 
its commission to another member firm. An institutional investor 
could thereby reimburse firms for valuable services, such as selling 
investment company shares or providing research services, unrelated 
action against ITT. See N.Y. Times, Aug. 3, 1973, at 1, col. 1 (city ed.); Wall St. J., 
Aug. 3, 1973, at 3, col. 2 (midwest ed.). 
157. See note 4 supra. 
158. See NYSE FACT BOOK, supra note 2, at 12. 
159. 4 INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR STUDY, supra note 2, at 2172. On December 5, 1968, a 
new NYSE rate schedule went into effect, containing, among other things, volume dis-
counts. N.Y. Times, Dec. 4, 1968, at 65, col. 7 (late city ed.). See NYSE Const. art. XV, 
§ 2, 2 CCH NYSE GUIDE 111702 (1973). 
160. NYSE Const. art. XV, § 8, 2 CCH NYSE GUIDE 11 1707 (1972). There is a 40 
per cent nonmember discount for certain firms. See NYSE Const. art. XV, § 2(h), 2 
CCH NYSE GUIDE 111702 (1973); NYSE Rule 385, 2 CCH NYSE GUIDE 11 2385 (1973). 
Recently the NYSE has proposed to restrict this nonmember discount to business 
handled by brokers for "nonaffiliated" accounts. In practical terms, this would preclude 
a broker-dealer whicb is not a NYSE member from obtaining the 40 per cent discount 
for trades performed for institutional affiliates. See NYSE Educational Circular No. 419 
Gune 8, 1973), BNA SEc. REG. &: L. REP. No. 206, at A-22 Gune 13, 1973); NYSE 
Educational Circular No. 415 Gune I, 1973), BNA SEC. REG. &: L. REP. No. 205, at K-1 
ijune 6, 1973). This interpretation was sharply criticized by Senator Williams in a 
letter to Acting SEC Chairman Owens. See BNA SEC, REG. &: L. REP. No. 210, at A-11 
Guly 11, 1973). 
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to the trading transaction in question. In addition to these "give 
ups," complex reciprocal practices developed whereby, in exchange 
for business directed to NYSE member firms by institutional cus-
tomers, those firms would refer unrelated business (business from 
other customers) to certain firms, designated by the institutional cus-
tomers, which were members of one or more regional exchanges. 
These regional exchange members could thus be awarded commis-
sions, through reciprocity at the direction of an institution, in return 
for other services, such as research or the sale of investment com-
pany shares.161 Indeed, if the institution itself became a member of 
a regional exchange or purchased a membership for a wholly owned 
subsidiary, it could recoup commissions either directly or through 
reciprocal business.162 
At the same time, trading volume was also increasing on the 
third market.163 Institutions and other large customers might, at 
times, realize substantial savings by trading on a net basis with a 
third market maker, if the over-all cost of the transaction on a net 
basis were less than the cost of the same transaction on an exchange, 
161. 4 INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR STUDY, supra note 2, at 2184-86. See also SPECIAL 
STUDY, supra note I, pt. 2, at 302-27, 930. For an extensive description of the various 
forms of reciprocity, sometimes referred to as "four way tickets," "step outs,'' and 
"mirror trades,'' see Hearings on S. 1164 and S. 3347 Before the Subcomm. on Securi-
ties of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 
pt. I, at 99-II5 (1972). See also Welles, The War Between the Big Board and the 
Regionals, INSTlTUTIONAL INVESTOR, Dec. 1970, at 21. For a more recent description of 
these practices, see Russo & Wang, The Structure of the Securities Market-Past and 
Future, 41 FORDHAM L. REv. I, 13-15 (1972); Miller & Carlson, Recapture of Brokerage 
Commissions by Mutual Funds, 46 N.Y.U. L. REv. 35 (1971). 
162. See House Hearings, supra note 5, pt. 8, at 4070. Cf. Moses v. Burgin, 445 F.2d 
369 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 994 (1971) (mutual fund's investment advisor 
and its underwriter held liable in derivative action for failure to disclose to fund's 
unaffiliated directors the possibility of recapturing brokerage commissions by use of 
"give ups"). In SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8746 (Nov. IO, 1969), [1969-
1970 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. ,I 77,761, the SEC's General Counsel 
stated that "[w]e do not believe that management has [a fiduciary duty to purchase 
a seat on an exchange for an affiliated broker-dealer in order to recapture commissions] 
if in the exercise of its best business judgment management determines that it is not 
in the best interest of the fund to create such an affiliate." Id. However, if a fund does 
in fact acquire a seat on an exchange that permits recapture of commissions "there 
may be circumstances under which such recapture could be required and that the 
management may not be free to simply retain for itself revenues derived from this 
source." Id. Despite the SEC's view that there "may be circumstances" under which an 
investment adviser may have a duty to credit back the savings on commissions to the 
ultimate beneficiaries (e.g., the shareholders of an investment company, through a 
reduction in the management fee charged by the investment adviser), the fact remains 
that under current law a broker-dealer may charge "the usual and customary broker's 
commission" for transactions effected by it on a national securities exchange on be-
half of an affiliated investment company or investment adviser. See Investment Com-
pany Act of 1940, § 17(e)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17(e)(2) (1970). 
163. See note 4 supra. 
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where a commission is added. Finally, institutions and others, by 
subscribing to automated intercommunications networks sometimes 
called the "fourth market," could trade directly with each other, 
bypassing the broker-dealer community entirely.164 The effect of 
these practices was to create a demand for a further revision of the 
commission rate structure toward an eventual system of negotiated 
rates, to increase demands for a restructuring of the markets into a 
national, or central, market, and to stimulate institutional interest 
in obtaining exchange membership. 
A. Revision of the Commission Rate Structure 
Virtually all of the arguments against lower commission rates 
or negotiated rates are based on a few assumptions. First, it is as-
sumed that relatively large brokerage firms operate more efficiently 
than smaller ones and are thus more likely to survive in a strongly 
competitive environment. This assumption lies behind the argument 
that the competition created by negotiated rates will lead to the 
demise of smaller, regional firms,165 which in turn will adversely 
affect the ability of smaller, less nationally known corporations to 
raise capital.166 This argument also assumes that regional securities 
firms rely on commissions from their brokerage business to subsi-
dize their underwriting costs, rather than vice versa. 
The second assumption is that negotiated rates will make agency 
brokerage unprofitable, thereby causing firms to do business as 
dealers rather than as agents,167 and that firms will lose interest in 
exchange membership and choose to trade on a net basis in the 
third market.168 
Third, it is assumed that negotiated rates, if they result in higher 
commissions for small investors, will discourage those investors from 
trading on the auction market, which depends for its vitality on a 
relatively large number of individual trades.169 
164. For a description of the fourth market, see House Hearings, supra note 5, pt. 
7, at 3·172-78. 
165. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 4, at 135, citing House Hearings, supra note 5, 
pt. G, at 2902-03, 2915-17, 3004-06, and pt. 7, at 3811-12. 
166. Hearings on S. 1169 Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. 
on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 19-20 (1972) (testimony of 
SEC Chairman William J. Casey). 
167. HouSE REPORT, supra note 4, at 135, citing House Hearings, supra note 5, pt. 7, 
at 3726-27, 3811. 
168. House Hearings, supra note 5, pt. 7, at 3811 (statement of American Stock 
Exchange). See also id. at 3741 (testimony of Robert W. Haack, president, New York 
Stock Exchange, Inc.). 
169. House REPORT, supra pote 4, at 135-36, 
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1. Correlation Between the Size of Brokerage Firms and 
Their Efficiency and Profitability 
Few studies have been made in the area of firm efficiency, but 
the work that has been done suggests the absence of a correlation 
between efficiency and size. The April 1972 study by Friend and 
Blume indicated that there was 
no support [for] the view that it is the small and regional firms which 
would be mainly affected by any decline in brokerage profitability, 
with possibly disastrous consequences for these firms and for sectors 
of the economy which they service. An analysis of the cost and profit 
structure of NYSE firms and of changes in the concentration of secur-
ities business over time leads to the conclusion that economies of 
scale in the brokerage business do not seem to be very strong, espe-
cially for regional firms. 
The differences in efficiency among firms in a given size group seem 
to be larger than among the averages of firms of different size, once 
other relevant firm characteristics are held constant. The aftermath 
of competitive rates may be a reduction in the total number of NYSE 
firms, but our analysis suggests that such a reduction will be dis-
tributed over firms of all sizes. Indeed under competitive rates a 
number of the more efficient small and regional organizations may be 
able to compete more effectively for securities business and hence 
grow in importance.110 
This conclusion is supported by earlier data obtained by an SEC 
staff economist in connection with the SEC's commission rate hear-
ings commenced in 1968. A study of a cross-section of 330 NYSE 
member firms found that although some of the industry's largest 
firms are among the most efficient, so are many of its smallest firms. 
A total of seventy firms, forty of which were in the smallest size 
category (less than 2,700,000 dollars in annual commission income), 
were shown to have been more efficient than the industry leader, 
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. The study also demon-
strated that some of the industry's largest firms were among the 
least efficient.171 Such data indicates that smaller or regional firms 
170. I. Friend & l\f. Blume, The Consequences of Competitive Commissions on the 
New York Stock Exchange (April 1972), reprinted in House Hearings, supra note 5, 
pt. 9, at 4404, 4444-45. For statistics regarding the relative lack of concentration in the 
brokerage business, see SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 54, which points out that the 
ten largest firms account for an aggregate of only 29.9 per cent of NYSE commission 
income, the twenty largest firms account for 43.9 per cent, and the fifty largest account 
for 62.2 per cent. 
171. See House Hearings, supra note 5, pt. 8, at 4ll4-l5, citing Gari! Exhibit I, 
Hearings on Commission Rate Structure Before the Securities & Exchange Commn. 
(File No. 4-144). 
In addition, see the tabular representation of profit margins of groups of NYSE 
member firms on commission business for the year 1971 contained in SENATE REPORT, 
supra note 4, at 53. The group containing the 34 clearing member firms having gross 
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will not be more adversely affected by negotiated rates than larger 
metropolitan firms. 
Even in the case of firms that might be hurt, due to inefficiency 
or other factors, it does not follow that loss of commission income 
from agency business will adversely affect these firms' ability or in-
centive to participate in undenvritings. Indeed, the House subcom-
mittee found that "the distribution of new issues is the most lucra-
tive part of the securities business and that some broker-dealers 
maintain their brokerage business in order to maintain a body of 
customers which enables the firm to secure underwritings."172 These 
findings are supported by the Friend and Blume study, which con-
cluded that "an analysis of the ... brokerage business indicates that 
there is little prospect that securities firms would cut down on their 
underwriting activity simply because their commission revenues may 
have declined."173 
2. Efject of Negotiated Rates on Agency Brokerage Business 
At the outset, it is important to note that the prevailing markets 
on exchanges such as the NYSE are only in a qualified sense auction 
markets where brokers act as agents for their customers in competi-
tive bidding. It has been estimated that in at least forty per cent of 
NYSE trading, a member firm is buying or selling for its own 
account.174 With this qualification in mind, the question becomes 
whether the over-all effect of negotiated rates will be to lessen the tend-
ency of broker-dealers to participate in trades on an agency basis and 
whether this, in turn, may have an adverse effect on the depth and 
liquidity of the markets as a whole. The question is not only com-
plex but extremely difficult to answer in the abstract. Realistically, 
it also involves the question of whether, in a climate of fully nego-
tiated rates, the broker-dealer community will be reluctant to price 
its services to yield a reasonable profit. There are at least two ways 
in which a broker-dealer may profit from a block trade. First, it may 
act as an agent and charge a commission for all or part of the trade 
commensurate with the effort, skill, and expense involved in its 
commission income in excess of 20 million dollars had an average profit margin of 
only 5.3 per cent. The average profit margin for all firms was 6.2 per cent, and the 
highest profit margin (10.5 per cent) was for the group of 18 medium-sized firms hav-
ing gross commission income between three and four million dollars. 
172. HousE REPORT, supra note 4, at 138. See also SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 
55, 58-59. 
173. I. Friend & M. Blume, supra note I 70, at 4445. 
174. House Hearings, supra note 5, pt. 6, at 3046 (testimony of Donald M. Feuer-
stein, counsel, Salomon Bros.). See also SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 106. 
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execution. Second, it may participate in the trade as a dealer and 
charge a net price that will reflect the same factors of effort, skill, 
and expense. There is little evidence that in a context of fully nego-
tiated rates a broker-dealer would tend to choose one method in 
preference to the other. 
Even if negotiated rates were to enhance the popularity of dealer 
trades, it does not necessarily follow that this result would be detri-
mental to the public interest. It has been argued that broker-dealers, 
deprived of -the cushion of fixed minimum commissions, might 
widen their spreads on dealer transactions by purchasing securities 
at deeper,discounts and selling them at higher premiums in order 
to compensate for the loss in commission income from agency trades. 
Such activity might increase the price volatility of shares, at least 
where substantial block trading is involved.175 Although there is 
some evidence that this chain of events has occurred in large trans-
actions where substantial parts of the trade are subject to negotiated 
commissions,176 there is also evidence to the contrary. For example, 
the implementation of a quotation system for bid and asked prices of 
NYSE-listed securities on the NASD Automated Quotation System 
(NASDAQ), used in over-the-counter market trading, resulted in a 
narrowing of the spreads, presumably because improved information 
about the market enhanced the competition between market 
makers.177 Indeed, the study by Friend and Blume concluded that 
"the reduction in commission rates associated with competitive 
pressures would probably not be offset by an increase in bid-ask 
spreads and might very well be reinforced by a decline in such 
spreads."178 This would be particularly likely to happen if market 
makers were permitted to compete directly with specialists as part of 
a central market system and if information concerning bid and asked 
quotations were uniformly available to all members of the system. 
Finally, it if became apparent that large transactions under a 
system of negotiated rates had unfavorable market impacts (an as-
sumption contravened by the empirical data assembled by the SEC's 
Institutional Investor Study),179 the problem could be dealt with 
175. House Hearings, supra note 5, pt. 8, at 4026-27 (testimony of Macrae Sykes, 
partner, Shields &: Co.). 
176. Id. 
177. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 4, at 139; SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 117. 
For the Senate subcommittee's case study on the inclusion of NYSE-listed stocks in 
NASDAQ, see Examination of the Decisions Involved in the Inclusion of Listed 
Securities in NASDAQ, Senate Hearings, supra note 31, pt. 3, at 3-17. 
178. I. Friend & M. Blume, supra note 170, at 4435. See also id. at 4431-33; SENATE 
REPORT, supra note 4, at 56-57. 
179. See 1 lNSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR STUDY, supra note 2, at XXI; 4 id. at 1462-65. 
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directly, rather than through perpetuation of fixed commission 
rates.180 The SEC has indicated its willingness to explore various 
alternative approaches to the problem.181 
3. Effect of Negotiated Rates on Small Investors 
Even under a revised commission rate structure, for small in-
vestors (persons trading in units of 100 to 1,000 shares) it would 
probably be erroneous to refer to commissions as negotiated, since 
180. HouSE REPORT, supra note 4, at 139. The Senate report found "disturbing" 
the SEC's failure to study individual instances of institutional decision-making in the 
light of recent sharp drops in certain widely traded securities and directed the SEC 
to obtain "regular and comprehensive information regarding institutional transactions 
which contribute to unusual price movements," so as to be in a position to "impose 
or recommend appropriate restrictions if they are required." SENATE REPORT, supra 
note 4, at 114. For an account of sharp price fluctuations in one stock, see SENATE 
REPORT, supra note 4, at 109-10 (Occidental Petroleum, July 17-19, 1972). Trading of 
the shares on the NYSE was halted several times, but the regional exchanges and the 
third market were able to absorb much of the buying pressure. 
181. See SEC Future Market Structure Statement, supra note 24, at 3450-51: 
A wide range of approaches has been suggested. One type of proposal is 
directed at decreasing the volume of block trading by imposition of limitations 
on the ability of institutions to change positions, or of market makers and block 
positioners to assist institutions to change positions, rapidly in circumstances 
where the market impact is likely to be severe. Another type of proposal would 
accept the possibility of greater price gyrations from institutions' block trading 
and would focus on finding ways to enable the public to participate in the block 
premiums or discounts. A third type of modification would recognize the funda-
mentally different nature of block transactions, as distinguished from normal retail 
auction transactions and, with the aim of avoiding retail market price fluctuations, 
would accord them separate treatment. For example, blocks might be crossed and 
reported on a tape but not interfaced with the retail auction process; that is, limit 
orders on the specialist's book would not participate at all. 
The foregoing proposals all raise very difficult questions and involve com-
peting theories as to the kinds of markets that are most efficient and fair. 
We would be reluctant to see any restriction on the liquidity of large blocks. 
Yet the cost of such liquidity may be greater price fluctuations. If greater price 
fluctuations, springing from the desire on the part of institutions to have instant 
liquidity, are to affect the value of individual holdings, directly or in pools, per-
haps the public should have the opportunity to participate in resulting discounts 
and premiums. It also may be that requiring institutions to reflect the size of their 
holdings ••• in valuing their portfolios would result in a better balance between 
the propensity to accumulate large blocks and the expectation of instant liquidity. 
Better rules, procedures and incentives for positioning and redistributing large 
blocks may contribute to the resolution of these difficult problems. 
Additional hearings focusing on the impact of institutional trading on the small in-
vestor are being held by the recently appointed Financial Markets Subcommittee of 
the Senate Finance Committee. See N.Y. Times, July 27, 1973, at 39, col. 7 (city ed.). 
See also N.Y. Times, July 31, 1973, at 50, col. 2 (late city ed.). In addition, Senator 
Harrison A. Williams, Jr., Chairman of the Subcommittee on Securities of the Sen-
ate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, introduced a bill (S. 2234, 93d 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1973)) on July 23, 1973, that would require institutional investors, 
such as banks, insurance companies, pension funds, and others having management 
authority over accounts valued at IO million dollars or more, to disclose their port-
folio holdings and any large transactions. See BNA SEC. REG. &: L. REP. No. 212, at A-10, 
D-1 CTuly 25, 1973); Wall St. J., July 23, 1973, at 2, col. 3 (eastern ed.). The Senate sub-
committee had previously advocated broader disclosure in this area. See SENATE REPORT, 
supra note 4, at 114. A similar recommendation had been made by the SEC's In-
stitutional Investor Study. See I INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR STUDY, supra note 2, at XI, 
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such investors generally do not have sufficient market power to 
negotiate in any real sense. Commissions on their trades might be 
termed competitive, in that firms would presumably compete for 
business by posting rates for small investors. The rates might reflect 
the cost of different services, such as simple execution of a trade, 
execution of trades accompanied by market advice (research), or 
custodial or other services. Rates reflecting separate charges for each 
service performed are generally referred to as "unbundled" rates. 
It is probable that the initial effect of competitive rates will be 
to increase charges for small trades.182 An increase may lessen in-
vestor incentive to trade, but if commissions adequately reflect the 
cost of transactions plus a reasonable profit, it is likely that broker-
dealers will find small trades more appealing under a revised sys-
tem than they are under the current rate system, and competition 
for the business of the small investor may increase. Such competi-
tion, particularly when coupled with the decreased processing costs 
that may result from greater uniformity and automation in clear-
ance and settlement, may eventually reduce the cost of small trades 
and thus lower commissions.183 
In any event, although increased commissions may discourage 
trading in small units, it by no means follows that investing (pur-
chasing for long-term appreciation) will decrease. Although the small 
investor may choose to allocate his capital to an investment com-
pany or some other form of indirect ownership in order to save on 
commissions, it is just as likely that he will regard commissions as a 
relatively unimportant part of a transaction's cost when compared 
with its over-all price. A shift in emphasis from trading to investing 
by small investors would lead to a decrease in the average number 
of transactions during a given period. If, however, the cost of trans-
actions were to decrease as a result of increased efficiency and cen-
tralization, investor interest in the market might increase, with 
greater numbers of small investors participating, even though on a 
long-term basis. 
4. Effect of Negotiated Rates on Institutional Investors 
An associated problem is the possible effect of negotiated rates 
on institutional investors. Since, as stated, the "bundling" of various 
services into brokerage "packages" has enabled institutional investors 
and others to purchase research and related services through "soft" 
182. See I. Friend & M. Blume, supra note 170, at 4444. 
183. As already indicated, the over-all savings that may result from a uniform 
system of clearance and settlement may amount to between 400 and 700 million dollars 
annually. See text accompanying note 73 supra. 
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commission dollars, it has been argued that an unfixed or competi-
tive rate system will result in "unbundling," and institutions will be 
required to purchase research through "hard" dollars (in cash rather 
than in commissions). This may in turn create difficulties because of 
restrictions imposed by contract or state law on the level of fiduciary 
compensation,18-1 thereby making it more difficult to absorb the cost of 
research purchased through "hard" dollars by increasing manage-
ment fees. In addition, there are uncertainties as to the fiduciary 
duty of an institutional manager to "shop" a trade in order to insure 
its execution at the lowest possible commission rate despite the 
availability of valuable research services that might be obtained 
through a broker-dealer charging a somewhat higher rate.185 To meet 
this concern, the Senate subcommittee has advocated amendments 
to the Investment Company Act and Investment Advisers Act that 
would clarify the ability of institutional managers to pay additional 
commissions for valuable research services.186 This proposed legis-
lation, coupled with the fact that research costs represent only a 
relatively small fraction (less than four per cent) of the operating ex-
penses of brokerage firms, 187 should ensure that research in sufficient 
184. House Hearings, supra note 5, pt. 8, at 4262. See also SENATE REPORT, supra 
note •!, at 61. 
185. See Delaware Management Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8128 
July 19, 1967), [1966-1967 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 1J 77,458, where a 
fund's investment adviser selected the broker offering a less favorable price because it 
provided the adviser with research, statistical services, and recommendations, as well as 
~elling fund shares. The Commission held that, regardless of the value of the research 
or other services, an investment adviser is never justified in consummating a transaction 
at an inferior price. This position appears to have been modified by SEC Securities Ex-
change Act Release No. 9598 (May 9, 1972), 37 Fed. Reg. 9988 (1972), reprinted in 
House Hearings, supra note 5, pt. 8, at 4257-59, where the SEC stated that "an invest-
ment manager should have discretion, in assigning an execution or negotiating the 
commission to be paid therefor, to consider the full range and quality of a broker's 
~ervices which benefit the account under management and need not solicit competitive 
bids on each transaction." It also added that "[t]he selection of a broker and the 
determination of the rate to be paid should, of course, never be influenced by the 
adviser's self-interest in any manner." Id. See also SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 
61-62, which suggests that "many institutional managers, and legal advisors, have read 
too much into the SEC's decision in the Delaware Management case." 
186. SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 62. A bill containing such amendments passed 
the Senate on June 18, 1973. S. 470, § 3, passed by the Senate, June 18, 1973, in 119 
CONG. REc. Sll366 (daily ed. June 18, 1973). Several witnesses before the House sub-
committee advocated similar legislation. See House Hearings, supra note 5, pt. 8, at 
3994, 4060 (testimony of Donald B. Marron, president, Mitchell, Hutchins & Co., Inc.), 
4093, 4184 (testimony of Robert M. Gardiner). Mr. Marron also testified that, in his 
opinion, the effect of negotiated rates has been to decrease the number of brokers 
from whom an institution purchases research but also to upgrade the over-all quality 
of the research rendered. See id. at 4051. 
187. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 60 n.95; House Hearings, supra note 5, 
pt. 8, at 4248 (testimony of Bernard H. Gari! that research costs constitute about three 
per cent of broker-dealers' commission charges). 
1616 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 71:1575 
quantity and quality will continue to be available to the investment 
community, even if commission rates are competitive. 
The House subcommittee has introduced legislation establishing 
a timetable for eliminating fixed commission rates. The break.point 
for negotiated rates would be reduced to 100,000 dollars by no later 
than February l, 1974, and commission rates on all transactions 
would be negotiated or competitive after February l, 1975, except 
that the SEC would be given power to extend the latter deadline by 
one year on a showing of public interest.188 The Senate has passed 
a bill,189 which, in contrast to the House subcommittee's measure, 
sets no fixed time schedule for phasing in fully competitive rates.190 
However, until rates are fully competitive, exchange members will 
be unrestricted as to the amount of brokerage they may perform for 
institutional affiliates or managed institutional accounts.191 Pre-
sumably, the assumption is that the distaste of the brokerage indus-
try for institutional membership, with its adverse effect on revenues 
of exchange member firms,192 will lead the industry to adopt fully 
188. H.R. 5050, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 202 (1973). 
189. S. 470 passed by the Senate, June 18, 1973, in 119 CONG. R.Ec. Sll366 (daily ed. 
June 18, 1973). 
190. An earlier draft of the measure contained an April 30, 1974, deadline for 
eliminating fixed rates, subject to a one-year extension. Institutional affiliates who were 
exchange members prior to January 16, 1973, would have been given three years to 
phase out their affiliated business after the 1974 or 1975 deadline. However, industry 
pressures in favor of continuing fixed rates, particularly in view of the financial diffi• 
culties of brokerage firms in 1973, made it impossible for Senator Williams, the sub-
committee chairman, to obtain the necessary votes to get the measure approved by the 
full committee. Thus, by an 11-4 vote in the full committee, a compromise was adopted 
whereby fixed rates could, at least theoretically, continue indefinitely, and yet the 
industry would be given an incentive to phase out fixed rates because, until that is 
done, exchange members are not subject to restrictions on the amount of brokerage 
that may be performed for an institutional affiliate or managed institutional account. 
Once fixed rates are eliminated, exchange members are given a two-year phase-in 
period to comply with the restrictions on institutional brokerage, a twenty per cent 
test applying during the first year and a ten per cent test applying during the second 
year, with a complete prohibition going into effect after the expiration of two years. 
See Wall St. J., May 17, 1973, at 2, col. 2 (midwest ed.). This approach may have been 
suggested by Robert I. Berdon, Treasurer of the State of Connecticut, who charac-
terized his so-called "Connecticut compromise," made previously in a proposal to the 
SEC, as providing that "[t]he exchanges could move at their own pace with certain 
overall limitations, but during that time they have to allow institutional membership. 
This lets them set their own target date for eliminating the fixed commissions, down 
to zero." Hearings on S. 470 and S. 488 Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate 
Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 267 (1973) [here-
inafter Senate Hearings on S. 470]. After the "compromise" was adopted by the full 
Senate committee, Senator Williams was quoted as saying that "the industry and its 
regulator know their goal is the elimination of fixed rates." See BNA SEc. REG. & L. 
REP. No. 202, at AA-2 (May 16, 1973). 
191. See S. 470, passed by the Senate, June 18, 1973, in 119 CONG. REc. S11366 
(daily ed. June 18, 1973). 
192. See text accompanying notes 232-34 infra. 
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compet1t1ve rates, particularly if continuing pressure to do so is 
applied by the SEC. The assumption may be incorrect, and the effect 
of the Senate bill may be merely to legitimize the status quo. 
Instead of moving toward competitive rates, the NYSE has appar-
ently reconsidered its previous approval of the concept and has in-
creased fixed rates for transactions not exceeding 300,000 dollars.193 
Although this purports to be merely a temporary expedient to re-
solve the financial difficulties of firms during the 1973 market slump, 
it drew sharp criticism from a congressional subcommittee chair-
man.104 A poll conducted by the Securities Industry Association in-
dicated that, out of a sampling of 183 firms, only one third favored 
increasing rates on orders of under 5,000 dollars, because of fears 
that such an increase would accelerate the small investor's exodus 
from the market.105 
193. The NYSE Board of Directors seemed at first to accept the concept of fully 
negotiated rates by mid-1974, provided tbat tbe third market be eliminated. See BNA 
Src. REG. & L. REP. No. 192, at A-8 (March 7, 1973). Since tbe elimination of tbe third 
market would require legislation and botb congressional subcommittees have indicated 
their belief tbat tbe third market should be retained, tbe NYSE position on the nego-
tiated rate issue may be in doubt. In fact, tbe NYSE recently put into effect a schedule 
of increased commissions on large trades to alleviate current profit problems of its 
member firms. Wall St. J., March 29, 1973, at 3, col. 2 (eastern ed.). NYSE Chair-
man Needham has been criticized for his frequent changes in position on tbe matter. 
See Wall St. J., April 2, 1973, at 4, cols. 2-3 (eastern ed.), where one member firm 
executive was quoted as saying tbat "[h]e's had three positions in six months .••• In 
October, he was for holding tbe line on negotiated rates to a $300,000 cutoff. In Feb-
ruary, he tells us we should go to fully negotiated rates. Now he's for raising fixed 
rates. The membership doesn't know where it's at." 
The NYSE more recently increased commission rates on orders of 100 to 5,000 
dollars by IO per cent, witb a 15 per cent increase in fixed commissions on orders 
between 5,000 and 300,000 dollars. In setting forth the proposed increase, the NYSE 
asserted that "fully competitive rates should be a long-term objective .•. [but that] 
tbe most urgent problem concerning tbe securities industry is tbe short term one 
of partially recovering recent cost increases.'' Wall St. J., May 4, 1973, at 2, col. 3 
(midwest ed.). A later proposal to impose a 0.4 per cent minimum commission charge 
on trades exceeding 300,000 dollars was subsequently abandoned. See Wall St. J., June 
8, 1973, at 4, col. 2 (midwcst ed.). The SEC has acquiesced in the NYSE's proposed 
rate increase, but only on the condition that fixed commissions be abolished by 
April 30, 1975. In addition, pending tbe abolition of fixed commissions, broker-dealers 
would be permitted to charge commissions higher than tbe fixed rate (so as to permit 
recovery of costs of processing small trades, for example). Also, broker-dealers must 
be permitted "to provide less than a full range of brokerage services presently fur-
nished customers in return for discounts of up to 10 per cent from the commission 
rate scheduled." Thus, a broker-dealer could charge a customer up to 10 per cent less 
for providing minimal services, such as execution and clearance. N.Y. Times, Sept. 12, 
1973, at 1, col. 6 & at 71, cols. 2-3 (city ed.); Wall St. J., Sept. 12, 1973, at 3, col. 1 (mid-
wcst ed.). 
194. BNA SEc. REG. & L. REP. No. 204, at A-IO (May 30, 1973). 
19.3. See Wall St. J., May IO, 1973, at 4, col. 4 (midwest ed.); N.Y. Times, May 10, 
1973, at 68, col. I (late city ed.). See also N.Y. Times, May 15, 1973, at 38, col. 1 (late 
city ed.) (critical editorial comment). Indeed, under the present fee schedule, which 
allows discounts for larger orders, a IO per cent increase on a 100 share order may 
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At best, the NYSE's action is but a stopgap measure, and, from 
a broader perspective, it is regressive and against the long-term in-
terests of the brokerage industry. Recent testimony before the Senate 
Subcommittee on Securities by Dr. William Freund, the NYSE's 
chief economist and vice president in charge of planning and re-
search, indicated that an increase in fixed rates is not the answer to 
the rising cost of doing business in the brokerage industry. Indeed, 
Dr. Freund indicated that fixed commission rates "may intensify 
pressures on profit margins since minimum rates have, in effect, also 
become maximum rates in our industry."196 The problem is also 
exacerbated by the phenomenon of "regulatory lag." Discussions 
between the industry and the SEC about increased commission rates 
began as early as 1968, but it was not until an emergency developed 
in 1970 that a fifteen dollar surcharge was approved. The rate 
schedule prevailing prior to the recent increase became effective 
in March 1972, but it was based on economic studies covering most 
of 1970. Thus, when adopted, the schedule was nearly two and a 
half years out of date and did not reflect the sharp inflation of the 
intervening period.197 Even though the increase has now been ap-
proved by the SEC, economic conditions are likely to change rapidly 
once more. 
The time has come to determine whether the brokerage business 
in this country is best run as a public utility, with administered 
prices for services, or whether in its own best interests (including the 
interests of the small investor whose participation it hopes to en-
courage) it would be more likely to flourish under a more flexible 
and realistic format of competitive rates.198 As in its approach to the 
problem on back office paperwork, the brokerage industry has tended 
to cling to the past, seeking certainty and short-term solutions to its 
problems but finding only added expense and further confusion. 
The survival of a viable securities market requires not only cen-
tralization of the markets (an objective difficult or impossible to 
attain in a context of fixed commission rates)199 and simplification 
of the paperwork in processing transactions, but also a more flexible 
method for brokerage firms to adjust charges for their services to 
amount to more money per 100 shares traded than a 15 per cent increase on trades 
of 1,000 shares or more. For the computation, see N.Y. Times, May 9, 1978, at 66, 
col. 3 (late city ed.). 
196. Senate Hearings on S, 170, supra note 190, at 445. 
197. Id. at 459. 
198. See Wall St. J., July 30, 1973, at 11, col. 3 (midwest ed.) (statement of Sen. 
Harrison Williams, Jr., to SEC). 
199. See text accompanying notes 158-64 supra. 
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yield a reasonable profit reflecting current costs and yield on invested 
capital. This can best be done through competition in commission 
rates. Rather than fearing competition, the securities industry 
should welcome it as a healthy solution to the present predicament. 
B. Restructured Central Market System 
The phenomenon of fragmentation, or diversification, of the 
markets has led to suggestions that the markets be centralized and 
more closely coordinated with one another. The elimination of fixed 
commission rates will abolish a powerful disincentive to the develop-
ment of a central market system, for the fragmentation of markets 
has in the past been largely attributable to the search by institutional 
investors for ways in which to save commission dollars.200 At least 
two general problems, as well as many exceptionally difficult specific 
problems, are involved in centralization. It is important at the out-
set to inquire whether centralization of the markets is in the public 
interest, and, if so, what type of centralization is desirable. One must 
also consider specific obstacles to centralization and how they may 
best be overcome. 
I. Advantages of Centralization 
The best way to approach this matter is to illustrate how frag-
mentation or diversification of the markets has operated to the 
detriment of investors. Suppose201 investor A gives his broker an 
order to purchase one hundred shares of General Motors at the 
best available price (a market order). Suppose investor B tells his 
broker to sell one hundred shares of General Motors at seventy-five 
dollars or higher (a limit order). If both orders were represented 
on the floor of a single exchange, they would be directly matched. 
A would pay seventy-five dollars per share plus a minimum commis-
sion of approximately sixty cents per share. B would receive seventy-
five dollars per share less a similar commission. Suppose, however, 
that A's order to purchase is on the NYSE, and B's order to sell is on 
the Pacific Coast Stock Exchange. In such case, the orders could not 
be directly matched. A dealer would have to purchase the one hun-
dred shares from B on the Pacific Coast Stock Exchange and then sell 
them to A on the NYSE. Since the dealer would have to be compen-
sated for performing this function, he would offer the buyer a price 
200. See text accompanying notes 161-64 supra. See also SENATE REPORT, supra note 
4, at 49-51, 57-58. 
201. This hypothetical situation is developed in more detail in House Hearings, 
supra note 5, pt. 6, at 2962-68 (statement of Donald M. Feuerstein). 
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higher than seventy-five dollars per share or offer the seller a price 
lower than seventy-five dollars per share ( or split the loss between 
buyer and seller), thus adding to the over-all cost of the transaction. 
In addition, instead of a single transaction transferring ownership 
of the stock from B to A, there would be two transactions at differ-
ent prices, which would inflate the volume in General Motors stock 
and create an additional price change. To complicate the matter 
even further, if the dealer interposed between A and B were not a 
member of the NYSE, he would have to sell the shares to a NYSE 
member or pay a commission to a NYSE member to act as his agent 
in selling the stock to A on the NYSE. The additional broker-dealer 
would, of course, take his profit from the transaction, further in-
creasing its cost. 
Moreover, these illustrations assume that the stock sold by the 
investor with the best offer eventually finds its way into the hands 
of the investor with the best bid. This would not necessarily be the 
case, for either A's order or B's order might be sent to the third 
market. NYSE member firms are by rule precluded from dealing 
with third market firms except under the most stringent conditions, 202 
and, even if a transaction is executed in the third market, it would 
not, under present conditions, be publicly reported. Even if the bids 
and offers appear on stock exchanges there is no guarantee that the 
best bids and offers will be executed. Suppose a market order on the 
NYSE to purchase one hundred shares of General Motors, a limit 
order on the NYSE to sell one hundred shares at $75.25, and a limit 
order on the Midwest Stock Exchange to sell one hundred shares at 
$75. The one hundred shares would be executed on the NYSE at 
$75.25, and the sell order on the Midwest Stock Exchange would go 
unexecuted. Whenever orders are not on the same stock exchange, 
the best public bid may fail to be matched with the best public offer. 
Indeed, there may be more than two or three contemporaneous 
orders in the same stock, and the stock may be traded on even more 
than three stock exchanges, as well as in the third market, thereby 
increasing the likelihood of unnecessary dealer transactions, missed 
executions, and misleading reporting of activity. 
Supplementing these illustrations, one witness testified before the 
House subcommittee that stock was sometimes traded by institutions 
on regional exchanges solely for the purpose of recapturing commis-
sions.203 Although such a practice might result in a saving on the 
commission, the institution might end up paying more for the stock, 
or receiving less for it if it were a seller. Suppose, for example, an in-
202. See NYSE Rule 394, 2 CCH NYSE GUIDE 1[ 2394 (1973). 
203. House Hearings, supra note 5, pt. 8, at 4024-25 (testimony of Macrae Sykes), 
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stitutional seller offers sixty-five dollars for General Electric but in-
sists that the transaction be executed on the PBW Stock Exchange 
(in order to recapture part of the commission). A NYSE member 
firm might refuse to enter into the transaction, but, later in the day, 
if the stock were selling at $64.50 on the NYSE, the firm might bid 
$64.50 for the institutional block on the PBW Stock Exchange, and 
the transaction might be executed there at that price. There would 
be no way to prove that, from the standpoint of the institutional 
seller, this was a poor execution because, at the time of the trade, 
the s,tock was selling for $64.50 on the NYSE. However, the fact of 
the matter would be that the institution's insistence on recouping 
commission costs by selling only on the PBW Stock Exchange would 
have entailed a delay that caused it a loss of fifty cents per share. 
Although trading on regional and other markets has at times had 
a beneficial effect in providing for greater competition in price and 
execution capability, as well as in providing further capital for ab-
sorbing relatively large blocks of stock and hence in increasing the 
depth and liquidity of the markets, there have been detrimental 
effects that probably counterbalance any benefits. Thus, as the House 
report pointed out: 
The fixed minimum commission rate schedule has led to distortions 
in trading patterns. In deciding where, when, and with whom to 
execute transactions, brokers and institutional investors consider the 
uses they can make of the fixed minimum commission dollars, in 
addition to the paramount consideration of best net price. Because 
of the absence of any central quotation system, moreover, investors 
or their brokers have difficulty determining where they can receive 
the best net price. In addition, since transactions on the regional ex-
changes and in the third market are not reported nationally, investors 
have difficulty determining whether they have received best execu-
tion. Also, rules such as New York Stock Exchange rule 394 inhibit 
competition and, in some cases, prevent investors from getting the 
best price. These factors affect adversely the depth, breadth, and 
liquidity of the nation's securities markets.204 
2. Desirable Form of Centralization 
At the risk of oversimplification, the proposals for restructuring 
the market may be grouped into two main categories: (1) the one-
exchange proposal, and (2) the federated-markets proposal. 
The one-exchange proposal envisages one format for trading 
listed stocks and a separate format for ttading nonlisted, over-the-
counter stocks. Listed stocks would be traded on a single exchange, 
which might consist of several market centers in various geographical 
204. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 4, at 118-19. 
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locations throughout the country. The various market centers, or 
floors, would be subject to uniform regulation by a single self-regu-
latory authority. This could be accomplished through a merger of 
the present regional exchanges with the NYSE and the AMEX. This 
single exchange would be the exclusive means for trading listed 
stocks, although several types of listing might be provided, depend-
ing upon the characteristics and share distribution of different 
issues.205 Over-the-counter trading in listed stocks would be pro-
hibited; thus, the third market as it now exists would be eliminated. 
Presumably, the fourth market would continue to exist, so share-
holders would still be permitted to trade directly among themselves. 206 
A market system similar to that suggested by the one-exchange 
proposal might be achieved without a merger of exchanges if the 
existing exchanges were subject to complete uniformity of rules, in-
cluding uniform requirements of disclosure of trades and bid and 
asked prices, and if membership on one exchange entailed the right to 
execute trades on any other exchange without additional cost (ex-
cept, perhaps, for the payment of floor brokerage charges when a 
member of the system executes trades for another member who does 
not have access to the physical facilities of the exchange floor where 
the trade takes place).207 Under such a scheme the various exchanges 
would be left intact to administer their own trading facilities, but 
the third market would nonetheless be abolished. 
The federated-markets proposal is more difficult to describe. 
205. See Martin Report, supra note 25, at 3194-95. Recently the NYSE's Board of 
Directors has voted to seek legislation to abolish the third market and to require that 
listed stocks be traded only on one or more registered national securities exchanges and 
under "substantially identical" rules. See BNA SEc. REG. &: L. REP. No. 187, at A-11 
CTan. 31, 1973). 
206. Elimination of the fourth market might entail imposing restrictions on the 
transfer of securities that traditionally have been thought to be against public policy, 
at least where shares are not closely held. See 2 F. O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS §§ 
7.06-.12 (1971 ed.); W. PAINTER, CORPORATE AND TAX ASPECTS OF CLOSELY HELD CoRPORA-
TIONS § 3.1 (1971). See also SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 121: "[R]estriction of trad-
ing in securities to a single market is a drastic measure, to be legislated only when the 
public interest clearly requires it. It is not a prerogative of corporate management, 
which has no legitimate interest in restricting the trading opportunities of investors 
who have acquired a company's shares." The SEC, in a policy statement relating to 
the proposed central market system stated that "initially" fourth market transactions 
would not be subject to the regulatory requirements imposed on those who trade 
within the central market system. However, "[s]hould the fourth market develop as 
a means to avoid the reporting and other obligations of trading within the system, 
the Commission will give prompt consideration to corrective measures, including rec-
ommending legislation if necessary, ~o bring such transactions within the scope of the 
system." Securities & Exchange Commn., Central Market System (March 29, 1973), 
reprinted in CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. No. 973, pt. 2, at 15-16 (April 2, 1973) [hereinafter 
SEC Market System Statement]. 
207. See HouSE REPORT, supra note 4, at 123. See also SEC Market System State-
ment, supra note 206, at 48-55. 
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Essentially, it rejects the suggestion that the present exchanges 
should be merged with one another or subjected to a single self-regu-
latory body. It seeks to perpetuate the pluralistic format of today's 
markets but attempts to achieve the general objectives of a central 
market system by effecting reforms in three main areas: (I) greater 
uniformity of disclosure of transactions and bid and asked quota-
tions in all markets through a consolidated tape and composite quo-
tation system, (2) greater, although not necessarily complete, uni-
formity in regulation of the various markets, and (3) elimination of 
many of the existing barriers to competition bet1V'een markets, in 
order to achieve, to the fullest extent possible, the advantages of a 
public auction market closely interrelc!,ted to a dealer market, with 
priority given, wherever possible, to public orders on the books of 
specialists and competing market makers. 
The one-exchange proposal has the advantages of relative sim-
plicity. Its main disadvantage is the monopoly that it would provide 
for those who control and belong to the central market. Not only 
would the regional exchanges be subsumed under one regulatory 
body, but the third market would be eliminated. The fundamental 
weakness in this approach is that no convincing case has been made 
for the proposition that the over-all objectives of a central market 
system can be achieved only through the creation of a monopoly. In 
view of our historic bias in favor of competition, the burden of 
proof should be on those who assert that a central market system 
cannot be attained except through the elimination of competition. 
There is a very real danger that any monopoly may eventually result 
in regulatory stagnation-a disinclination to experiment with inno-
vative approaches to new problems as they arise. In the words of 
President Nixon's 1970 Economic Report: 
The American experience with regulation, despite notable achieve-
ments, has had its disappointing aspects. Regulation has too often 
resulted in protection of the status quo. Entry is often blocked, prices 
are kept from falling, and the industry becomes inflexible and in-
sensitive to new techniques and opportunities for progress. 
There is no clear safeguard against these dangers, but more reli-
ance on economic incentives and market mechanisms in regulated 
industries would be a step forward.208 
208. 1970 ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 107-08 (H. Doc. No. 253, 92d Cong., 
1st Sess. (1970)). SEC Commissioner Loomis testified that to abolish the third market 
would be "contrary to the stated position of the Commission both in its statement of 
the future structure of the securities markets and earlier in its transmittal of the 
Institutional Investor report." Senate Hearings, supra note 31, pt. 3, at 229. Both con-
gressional subcommittees have endotsed the SEC's position in this respect. See SENATE 
REPORT, supra note 4, at 96; HouSE REPORT, supra note 4, at 121-23. See also N.Y. 
Times, March 16, 1973, at 55, col. 8 (late city ed.) (speech by former SEC Chairman 
G. Bradford Cook). 
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The federated-exchange concept has none of the disadvantages 
of a monopoly. Correspondingly, it seems better designed to ensure 
the continuing vitality of the regulatory structure through competi-
tion between market centers. On the other hand, unless there is con-
siderable uniformity in regulation and coordination of disclosure, 
such a structure would entail some of the disadvantages of today's 
markets-failure to report transactions and to disclose ( except on a 
limited basis) bid and asked quotations, together with what might be 
termed destructive competition in developing rules that favor par-
ticular groups.209 Although innovation in developing new methods 
of executing, reporting, and processing transactions should not be 
discouraged, competition in other regulatory areas, such as restrict-
tions on membership and prohibitions against certain types of short 
selling and other forms of manipulation, should be replaced by 
uniformity. In addition, existing barriers to competition between 
markets should be eliminated wherever possible and entry to the 
market system opened up to all who qualify under appropriate 
standards of financial and professional responsibility. 
3. Problems Associated with Centralization 
a. Consolidated tape and composite quotation systems. The 
over-all objective of composite reporting of transactions and bid and 
asked prices is to ensure that information on all trades, wherever 
they take place, is rapidly available throughout the system, and that 
all members of the system have access to information concerning 
bid and asked prices. Today trades are reported primarily through 
the separate tapes administered by the NYSE and AMEX, which 
report only trades taking place on their respective exchanges and 
hence do not report trades of dually listed stocks that take place on 
regional exchanges or trades in the third market. Similarly, bid and 
asked quotations on an exchange are available only to members of 
that exchange. Although recently the NYSE offered to disclose bid and 
asked quotations in its listed stocks to members of other exchanges, 
the proposal did not envisage disclosure of such quotations to third 
market makers.210 It is apparent, then, that disclosure by the ex-
changes has been selective, and, since disclosure has been linked to 
exchange membership, insufficient disclosure has impeded competi-
tion between market centers.211 
209. Without uniform regulations, the various exchanges might compete with each 
other in relaxing their rules in order to attract a greater volume of trading. St:t: 
HouSE REPORT, supra note 4, at 129. 
210. See Senate Hearings, supra note 31, pt. 3, at 226-29. 
211. For one result of this lack of communication between market centers, see text 
following note 201 supra. 
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On March 8, 1972, the SEC proposed two rules that would require 
exchanges and market makers to provide on a current basis to 
"vendors of market information" reports of all transactions in listed 
securities and quotations of specialists and third market makers in 
such securities.212 Subsequently, an SEC advisory committee recom-
mended a system by which trades would be reported through tapes 
or interrogation display devices in two separate streams of data, one 
consisting of trades of all stocks listed on the NYSE and the other con-
sisting of trades of all other listed stocks. In addition, the transaction 
reports would indicate the market in which the trade was effected "un-
til regulation in all markets is appropriately equal for the protection of 
the public interest."213 Although the SEC eventually adopted most of 
the recommendations of its advisory committee, it failed to accept the 
recommendation that one of the two data streams should include 
trades in all listed stocks other than those listed on the NYSE.214 This 
failure was a concession to arguments by the AMEX that the identity 
of its market would be diluted by reporting trading in securities listed 
only on regional exchanges with trading in AMEX-listed stocks.215 
The Senate subcommittee stated that adoption in full of the SEC's 
advisory committee report was the only way to ensure competition 
between regional exchanges and the NYSE and the AMEX; other-
wise, securities listed on regional exchanges could not receive the 
amount of publicity available to NYSE- and AMEX-listed stocks.216 
But expansion of the list of stocks reported on the tapes would result 
in the inclusion of securities of many companies that do not meet 
the standards of size and responsibility traditionally required by the 
AMEX. To resolve this problem, the subcommittee recommended 
authorizing the administrator of the composite reporting system to 
set minimum criteria for companies with securities in each data 
stream.217 The subcommittee stressed the importance of neutrality 
on the part of the administering entity and suggested the establish-
ment of a quasi-governmental body if no other satisfactory solution 
can be reached.218 
212. See SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9529 (March 8, 1972), 37 Fed. 
Reg. 5760 (1972); SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9530 (March 8, 1972), 37 
Fed. Reg. 5761 (1972). 
2lll. Report to the SEC by the Advisory Committee on Market Disclosure on a 
Composite Transaction Reporting System, reprinted in BNA SEC. REG. & L. REP. No. 
161, at E-1 Only 19, 1972). 
214. See SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9731 (Aug. 14, 1972), [1972-1973 
Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 11 78,938; SEC Securities Exchange Act Release 
No. 9850 (Nov. 8, 1972), [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 11 79,082. 
215. SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 99. 
216. Id. 
217. Id. 
218. SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 99-100. The New York, American, Midwest, 
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Very similar problems arise with the composite quotation system. 
The same criterion of neutrality to avoid discrimination between 
different market centers that applies to composite reporting of trans-
actions also applies to reporting composite quotations. The SEC's 
advisory committee has suggested that the composite quotation sys-
tem should be operated by the same entity that operates the trans-
action reporting system.219 
b. Uniformity of regulation among market centers. The question 
of uniformity of regulation among market centers is closely inter-
Pacific Coast, and PBW Stock Exchanges, together with the NASD, have submitted 
a two-network consolidated tape plan to the SEC. Network "A" would carry all sale 
prices of NYSE registered securities, regardless of where the transaction occurred. Net-
work "B" would carry all last sale prices of securities registered on the American Stock 
Exchange, regardless of where the transaction occurred, plus information on securities 
registered on the Midwest, Pacific Coast, and PBW Stock Exchanges if such securities 
meet a test of "eligible securities" contained in the plan. To "avoid duplication" the 
Securities Industry Automation Corporation (SIAC) (essentially a pooling of automa-
tion services by the NYSE and the AMEX) would be designated as the recipient and 
processor of price information and the consolidated tape would be administered by a 
Consolidated Tape Association. The latter would consist of an eight-member, repre-
sentative policy-making body, with the NYSE and the AMEX each being entitled to 
appoint two members (thus collectively comprising half the membership). Since the 
affirmative vote of five of the eight members would be necessary for any action by 
the Consolidated Tape Association, the NYSE and the AMEX, by acting together, 
could effectively veto further changes in the plan. In addition, proposed amendments 
to the plan would not be effective unless they receive the consent of any plan partici-
pant that reported to the processor (SIAC) 51 per cent or more of its daily closing 
prices reported on either network of the tape during the preceding twelve calendar 
months. This would give the two major exchanges further veto powers. For discussion of 
the composite tape plan, see BNA SEc. REG. &: L. REP. No. 192, at A-9 (March 7, 1973); 
BNA SEC. REG. & L. REP. No. 193, at A-9 (March 14, 1973); BNA SEC. REG. & L. REP. 
No. 199, at A-9 (April 25, 1973). On June 13, 1973, the SEC recommended changes 
in the plan. As to eligibility standards for listing on the tape, the SEC proposed to 
apply the so-called "permanent" standards of the plan to all issues listed on the tape 
(thus precluding the application of lesser standards to securities that might otherwise 
be "grandfathered in" by being listed on regional exchanges when the plan goes into 
effect). After the plan is adopted subsequent listing of securities would be governed 
by standards akin to those presently imposed by the AMEX. Finally, under the SEC's 
proposal, the network would remain open for as long as a national securities exchange 
is open, provided that this is consistent with the SEC's normal business hours. SEC Secu-
rities Exchange Act Release No. 10218 Gan. 13, 1973), 38 Fed. Reg. 15999 (1973). The 
SEC's proposals met with further resistance from the New York and American Stock 
Exchanges. See Wall St. J., July 16, 1973, at 2, col. 3 (eastern ed.); id., July 19, 1973, 
at 8, col. I. The NYSE issued a so-called "white paper," which in broad outline re-
peated arguments previously made that any tape system should be preceded by the 
establishment of uniform market making and other rules designed to reduce or elim-
inate price disparities in individual stocks traded in different markets. It also called 
for the abolition of the third market and the retention of restrictions on trading such 
as NYSE Rules 113 and 394, described in notes 226-27 infra. See Wall St. J., July 19, 
1973, at 8, col. 1 (eastern ed.). The SEC, however, rejected demands by the NYSE that 
it delay the implementation of its proposal. See N.Y. Times, July 19, 1973, at 49, col. 8 
(late city ed.). For further discussion of the problem of uniformity in regulation among 
market centers, see text accompanying notes 220-30 infra. 
219. See discussion in Report to the SEC by the Advisory Committee on Market 
Disclosure on a Composite Quotation System, reprinted in BNA SEC. REG. & L. REP. 
No. 178, at H-1 (Nov. 22, 1972). 
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twined with other issues, such as the development of consolidated 
transaction reporting and composite quotation systems. Indeed, in a 
broad sense, it subsumes most of the problems that must be solved 
in creating a central market system. Today's market system is char-
acterized by a wide disparity in regulation, which has led to unde-
sirable forms of competition between market centers. There is little 
justification for allowing the execution of a transaction on a regional 
exchange merely to avoid qisclosure. Similarly, market centers should 
not be permitted to compete with one another by adopting more 
lenient rules on institutional membership or on reciprocal practices 
of various types.220 At a very minimum a central market system 
should be characterized by complete uniformity of rules pertaining 
to disclosure and access to the markets. In addition, there should 
be considerable uniformity in other rules, such as restrictions on 
manipulatory practices.221 
c. Interface between the third market and the exchanges. A 
particularly troublesome regulatory problem associated with the 
federated-markets proposal is that of providing a suitable interface 
between the third market and the markets on the exchanges. Trad-
ing on the exchanges is often described as an auction market where 
brokers act as agents and priority is given to public market or limit 
orders on the specialists' books. In contrast, trading in the third 
market currently provides no mechanism for giving priority to 
public orders, since third market makers generally act as dealers and 
trade on a net basis. However, the exchange markets are not pure 
auction markets, and they involve considerable dealer activity and 
prearranged assembly of block trades and block positioning.222 
Similarly, the over-the-counter market is not exclusively a dealer 
market but often combines agency and auction characteristics.223 
Although the two markets are different, it is easy to overemphasize 
the differences. The Senate subcommittee pointed out that "the 
question ... is not whether the public is better served by an 'auction' 
or by a 'dealer' market, but what features of those two markets 
220. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 4, at 129. 
221. The inability of industry groups to agree on the desired degree of uniformity 
in specific rules has been an obstacle to the development of the central market system 
and particularly the development of composite transactional reporting. See House 
Hearings, supra note 5, pt. 7, at 3781-89. The SEC generally favors the federated-
markets approach and advocates uniformity in regulation among market centers with 
respect to qualifications for exchange membership, short sales, and other manipulative 
practices, as well as disclosure of transactions. See SEC Market System Statement, supra 
note 206, at 31-32. 
222. SENA'IE REPORT, supra note 4, at 106. 
223. Id. 
1628 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 71:1575 
should be preserved in the developing central market system."224 The 
subcommittee characterized the over-all goals of a central market 
system as "(I) [t]he maintenance of stable and orderly markets with 
maximum capacity for absorbing trading imbalances without undue 
price movements; and (2) [c]entralization of all buying and selling 
interest so that each investor will receive the best possible execution 
of his order, regardless of where it originates."225 
The first objective may be achieved through modifying some of 
the restrictions presently imposed on specialists and block position-
ers,226 modifying or repealing rules that restrict exchange members 
in executing trades in the third market when prices are more favor-
able than those prevailing on an exchange, 227 and subjecting market 
makers to duties akin to those imposed on specialists to create orderly 
and continuous markets in depth in those stocks in which they 
choose to deal. 228 
The second objective would be achieved by a requirement that 
224. Id. 
225. Id. at 107. 
226. Id. at 106-15 (suggesting modification or repeal of NYSE Rule 113, 2 CCH 
NYSE GUIDE ,i 2113 (1972), which precludes specialists from dealing directly with 
institutions and certain other persons, and of NYSE Rule 438, 2 CCH NYSE GUIDE 1J 
2438 (1970), which precludes firms from publishing bids and offers in listed securities). 
227. SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 104-05 (suggesting modification of NYSE 
Rule 394, 2 CCH NYSE GUIDE ,i 2394 (1973), which restricts member firms in their 
ability to engage in transactions in listed stocks other than on the floor of the NYSE). 
For a similar recommendation by the House subcommittee, see HOUSE REPORT, supra 
note 4, at 126-27. The SEC bas concurred in the suggestion that rule 394 should be re-
pealed, at a time no later than the date on which the composite quotation system is 
implemented. In the SEC's view, the rule should be replaced by a broader require-
ment that would confine all trading in listed securities to the central market system, 
without, however, eliminating the third market, which would be a part of the system. 
See SEC Market System Statement, supra note 206, at 63-64. The fourth market would 
also be retained. See note 206 supra. For recent discussion of the need for repeal of 
rule 394, see Russo & Wang, supra note 161, at 16-21. 
228. See House Hearings, supra note 5, pt. 6, at 3094. See also id. at 3042, 3061. 
It is likely that even though affirmative obligations are imposed on market makers 
to make continuous and orderly markets in depth, the major impetus towards healthy 
market making will be competition. As the former Director of the SEC's Institutional 
Investor Study pointed out (with regard to the analogous problem of imposing affirma-
tive duties on specialists): 
Regulation at best can establish only minimal standards of performance and then 
tends to be more effective in prohibiting misconduct than in motivating persons 
to take positive steps to create and perfect a better marketplace. It is one thing to 
prevent a person, by rule, from "beating bis wife"; it is quite another to attempt 
in the same way to require him to be "kind" to her. 
House Hearings, supra note 5, pt. 6, at 2943-44 (statement of Donald B. Farrar). The 
SEC Market System Statement, supra note 206, at 33-34, proposes uniform rules regu-
lating the activities of specialists on exchanges (thus rescinding certain exemptions 
from regulation hitherto enjoyed by specialists on regional exchanges), and also 
subjecting third market makers to comparable regulation by requiring the NASD 
to file a plan for regulating members of the system that are not also members of 
exchanges. 
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third market trades yield priority, parity, and precedence to out-
standing public orders located anywhere in the central market sys-
tem. 229 This might be done through automation, and, in all prob-
ability, it would entail automation of the specialists' books to pro-
vide disclosure of public orders to other specialists and market 
makers.230 
229. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 112; HOUSE REPORT, supra note 4, at 128. 
The SEC Market System Statement, supra note 206, at 18-25, proposes to implement 
this concept by promulgating two rules. The first rule, referred to as the "auction 
trading rule," would provide "price priority protection for all public orders through-
out the system." SEC Market System Statement, supra, at 18. All public orders would 
be stored in a central electronic repository and would have to be satisfied or "cleared" 
before a proposed transaction could take place. The SEC indicates that the clearance 
process would probably have to be performed by the facilities of the exchanges. Only 
public orders at better or equal prices would be protected. Thus, a public order to 
sell at 39¼ must be filled before a block trade could clear at 39¾, Id. at 18-19. The 
SEC also indicated that it might be desirable to provide for "time priority protection" 
as well. Thus, if five bids are entered into the system at 49, the first bid to be entered 
would be given priority over the others. Id. at 18 n.21. Public limit orders might be 
permitted to participate in discounts generated by block trades if such limit orders 
are restricted in size (say, to 100,000 dollars in value). Thus, if a block trade were pro-
posed at 39¼, limit orders on specialists' books to purchase at higher prices (e.g., 
!19¼) might be filled at the lower price (39¾) proposed for the block trade. The 100,000 
dollar limitation would discourage professional traders who learn of a potential block, 
but who do not wish to purchase the entire block, from injecting themselves into the 
transaction to obtain bargain prices for part of the block merely by entering a higher 
"public" order. Id. at 20 n.24. 
The second trading rule proposed by the SEC, known as the "public preference 
rule" would "accord preferential treatment to public orders by preventing any member 
of the system from participating as principal in any system transaction unless his 
purchase price is higher, or his sale price lower, than any public bid or offer recorded 
in the system." Id. at 22. The effect of the rule would be to preclude brokers from 
competing as dealers or principals with public orders except at better prices, thereby 
strengthening the auction market. 
230. Id. For the House subcommittee's legislative implementation of its pro-
posal, see H.R. 5050, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 208-09, 305 (1973). The bill would give 
the SEC until February I, 1975, to establish a national market system and would 
require it to make annual reports of its progress in doing so to Congress. The SEC 
statement also advocates only that public limit orders be "entered into and stored 
in a central electronic repository by a specialist and ••. not be publicly available." 
SEC Market System Statement, supra note 206, at 18. Although the system would 
provide for automatic clearance of public orders entered into the system at better 
prices, a specialist would have actual knowledge only of limit orders that appear on 
his own books. Such inequality of information concerning limit orders may result in 
unfair advantages to some specialists, and the SEC concedes that "[i]t may be deter-
mined that the same result could be achieved more efficiently, although at the sacrifice 
of confidentiality, simply by making all limit orders available to all specialists." Id. 
at 18 n.22. It is arguable that equal access to limit orders should also be given to 
market makers if the latter are under obligations similar to those imposed on specialists. 
Senator Harrison A. Williams, Jr., has recently introduced S. 2519, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1973), a broad-ranging bill entitled the National Securities Market System Act of 
1973, to implement further the Senate subcommittee's proposals relating to the markets, 
including the proposals to establish a consolidated tape and composite quotation 
system, to broaden the SEC's authority over the self-regulatory bodies, as discussed in 
text accompanying notes 108-42 supra, and to authorize the SEC to require specialists 
and market makers to give public orders priority over transactions by broker-dealers 
for their own accounts, as discussed in note 229 supra. The bill also directs the SEC 
1630 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 71:1575 
d. Access to the central market system. The question of access to 
the central market system is as controversial as is the problem of the 
appropriate market structure. In recent years growing demands by 
institutions for membership on national securities exchanges have 
accentuated the problem.231 
The controversy over exchange membership for institutions has 
been intense and at times emotionally charged. The controversy 
arises from two salient facts: (1) Institutional membership tends to 
reduce commission dollars, which, absent such membership, would 
be received by exchange member firms for institutional accounts; 
and (2) the rules for membership on various exchanges have differed 
widely and have not been administered with impartiality. 
The first point, if not entirely self-evident, is at least easily 
understood. If institutions do their own brokerage or are entitled 
to favorable commission rates because of their exchange membership, 
exchange member firms who might otherwise perform brokerage 
services for institutions and charge the full nonmember commis-
sion rate lose money. Since not all exchange member firms do sub-
stantial amounts of institutional business, the adverse impact of 
institutional membership in terms of lost commission dollars would 
be uneven, with some firms losing much more business than others. 
For example, of the value of orders of 500,000 dollars or more, five 
NYSE member firms accounted for thirty-seven per cent in the first 
quarter, forty-four per cent in the second quarter, and forty-nine per 
cent in the third quarter of 1971.232 During the third quarter of 
1971, orders of 500,000 dollars or more made up twenty-two per 
cent of the gross of NYSE member firms doing a retail business (in 
which the average order is for 300 shares or less), thirty-one per cent 
of the gross in intermediate-sized firms (where average orders range 
to forbid exchange or NASD rules that impose burdens on competition and are not 
"reasonably necessary" to achieve the purposes of the Securities Exchange Act. Among 
the rules that would be eliminated are those that restrict communication among 
market makers and specialists. See text accompanying notes 226-28 supra. In addition, 
the bill would permit stock exchanges to begin trading in certain unlisted issues, 
subject to SEC approval, without .the necessity of formal action by the issuer's manage-
ment to "list" the security on a particular exchange. For discussion of this point, see 
SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 133-35. For the text of the bill, see BNA SEC. REc. & 
L. REP. No. 221, at E-1 (Oct. 3, 1973). 
231. State pension funds have recently joined the ranks of institutional investors 
wishing to acquire exchange membership. For example, the state of Connecticut has 
been given access to the PBW Stock Exchange through an afliliate, Connecticut Nutmeg 
Securities, Inc. See Wall St. J., Dec. 14, 1972, at 5, col. 1 (midwest ed.). Similarly, the 
New York City Finance Administrator has indicated an interest in an affiliate that 
might qualify for membership on the NYSE. N.Y. Times, Jan. 23, 1973, at 49, col. 8 
(late city ed.). 
232. See House Hearings, supra note 5, pt. 7, at 3716 (testimony of Robert W. Haack, 
president, New York Stock Exchange, Inc.). 
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from 300 to 1500 shares), and forty-five per cent of the gross of 
member firms doing primarily institutional business (where average 
orders exceed 1500 shares).233 It should not be assumed, however, 
that all institutions would be anxious to join exchanges even if they 
were permitted to do so, especially if the breakpoint for negotiated 
rates were lowered further.234 Exchange member firms that currently 
do institutional business would retain those institutional clients 
who did not choose to join exchanges. Notwithstanding this fact, 
it is still apparent that the aggregate effect of institutional member-
ship on exchange member firms would be a substantial loss in com-
mission dollars. 
Until the recent SEC promulgation of rule 19b-2,235 which at-
tempts to achieve uniformity in exchange membership require-
ments, exchange rules concerning qualifications for membership have 
differed widely and have been unevenly administered. The NYSE 
and AMEX rules were the most strict, requiring that the "primary" 
purpose or activity of exchange member firms and their "parents" 
(any firm or institution controlling a member firm) be the trans-
.action of business as a broker or dealer in securities.236 These rules 
effectively excluded insurance companies and investment companies 
from membership on the nation's two largest exchanges. The rules 
of the regional exchanges varied from the relatively moderate rules 
of the Midwest Stock Exchange, which required a member firm to 
do at least fifty per cent of its business with nonaffiliates (thus per-
mitting a firm to do up to fifty per cent of its business with an 
affiliated institution), to the much more lenient approach of the 
PBW Stock Exchange, which required only that its members be 
engaged in business as a ·broker or dealer in securities (and thus 
did not require them to do a public brokerage business). Institu-
tions could therefore become members of the PBW Stock Exchange 
or achieve the advantages of PBW membership through ownership 
of an affiliated PB"\,V member firm.237 
Added to this disparity in rules among exchanges was an incon-
sistency in their administration. For example, the NYSE permitted 
its "parent" test to be either waived or liberally construed in sev-
eral instances, apparently to favor individual firms or promote the 
23!1. Id. 
234. See HouSE REPORT, supra note 4, at 150. 
235. 17 C.F.R. § 240.19b-2 (1973). 
236. NYSE Rule 318, 2 CCH NYSE GUIDE ,I 2318 (1973); AMEX Rule 314, 2 CCH 
AMEX GUIDE 1 9372 (1973). 
237. For a general discussion of the membership requirements of the different ex-
changes, see SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9950 Gan. 16, 1973), 38 Fed. Reg. 
3902, 3914 (1973). 
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rehabilitation of distressed member firms by the infusion of capital 
from institutional sources.238 In addition, while the "parent" test 
effectively excluded institutions from exchange membership, it did 
not preclude exchange members from engaging in money manage-
ment. Thus, exchange members could perform brokerage and act 
as advisers for investment companies as well as profit from in-
creasing amounts of other forms of money management, particularly 
pension fund management; nonmember institutions, on the other 
hand, were at an economic disadvantage in competition with mem-
ber firms in money management because of their inability to qual-
ify for membership on the large national securities exchanges. 
On January 16, 1973, the SEC adopted rule 19b-2,239 ostensibly 
to achieve uniformity in the regulation of membership on national 
securities exchanges. The approach of the rule is to require that 
members effect at least eighty per cent of their business, calculated 
in terms of value of exchange securities transactions, for or with 
customers other than "affiliated persons."240 
238. See Statement of Investors Diversified Services, Inc. &: Jeffries &: Co. 21-24 (Oct. 
19, 1971), in Public Investigatory Hearing on Structure of the Securities Markets 
Before the Securities b Exchange Commn. (File No. 4-147, 1971), reprinted in House 
Hearings, supra note 5, pt. 9, at 4455, 4475-78. See also id. at 46-50, reprinted at 4500-04. 
239. See SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9950, supra note 237, at 3928. The 
rule is codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.19b-2 (1973). The rule resulted from a proceeding 
brought by the SEC under section 19(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 
U.S.C. § 78s(b) (1970), which gives the SEC the power to initiate changes in exchange 
rules. The only other such proceeding was the so-called Multiple Trading Case (Rules 
of the New York Stock Exchange, 10 S.E.C. 270 (1941)), in which the SEC forced the 
NYSE to abrogate a rule that prohibited its members from trading dually listed 
stocks on regional exchanges. 
240. The term "affiliated person" is defined as including 
(i) any person directly or indirectly controlling, controlled by or under common 
control with such member, whether by contractual arrangement or otherwise, 
provided that the right to exercise investment discretion with respect to an 
account, without more, shall not constitute control; 
(ii) any principal officer, stockholder or partner of such member or any person 
in whose account such person has a direct or material indirect beneficial interest; 
and 
(iii) any investment company of which such member, or any person controlling, 
controlled by or under common control with such member, is an investment adviser 
within the meaning of the Investment Company Act of 1940. 
17 C.F.R. § 240.19b-2(b)(l) (1973). "Principal officer, stockholder or partner" is de-
fined in section (b)(3). See 17 C.F.R. § 240.19b-2(b)(3) (1973). "Control" is said to be 
presumed if "[a] person has a right to participate to the extent of more than 25 per 
cent in the profits of ..• [another) person or owns beneficially, directly or indirectly, 
more than 25 per cent of the outstanding voting securities of such person." 17 C.F.R. 
§ 240.19b-2(b)(2) (1973). 
Pension fund management is not prima facie "affiliated" business unless the 25 per 
cent test is met or there are other factors that indicate that the member firm "controls" 
the pension fund account. The status given pension fund managers is of particular 
importance since this type of money management is currently growing at a much more 
rapid rate than investment companies. It has been urged that pension fund manage-
ment should be included under the rule, due to the high probability that a broker-
dealer may have a form of de facto control over the pension fund account, although 
such account may still technically be under the control of the pension fund directors. 
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Since the technical aspects of the rule are amply discussed in an 
extensive SEC release that accompanied its adoption,241 it seems ap-
propriate to focus this discussion on the major policy problems in-
volved. Foremost may be the SEC's decision to act in the face of op-
position from the congressional subcommittees that had just com-
pleted extensive studies of their own and had recommended alter-
native solutions to the problem.242 The SEC's action was also opposed 
by the Justice Department.243 
See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 4, at 150-51. The SEC statement on the future structure 
of the securities markets, defines "nonaffiliated" persons as not including "institutional 
parents or investment companies or other institutional funds which are managed under 
contracts or arrangements which give the brokerage firm investment discretion." SEC 
Future Market Structure Statement, supra note 24, at 3457. For the SEC's current view 
of the matter, see SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9950, supra note 237, at 
3922. See also House Hearings, supra note 5, pt. 8, at 4152-53, 4160. See also id. at 
4281-82. 
The bill passed by the Senate prohibits (with certain exceptions) member firms 
from transacting exchange business for their own accounts, for the accounts of affiliates, 
or for a "managed institutional account." The latter term is defined as an account of 
a bank, insurance company, trust company, investment company, separate account, 
pension-benefit or profit-sharing trust or plan, foundation, or charitable endowment 
fund, or other similar type of institutional account "for which such member or any 
affiliated person thereof (A) is empowered to determine what securities shall be pur-
chased or sold, or (B) makes day-to-day decisions as to the purchase or sale of securities 
even though some other person may have ultimate responsibility for the investment 
decisions for such account." S. 470, § 2, passed by the Senate, June 18, 1973, in 119 
CONG. REc. SII366 (daily ed. June 18, 1973). 
The NYSE has recently sought a highly restrictive interpretation of the term "affil-
iated person," which would, in effect, establish a conclusive presumption of "control" 
in specified situations, as well as a presumption that all institutional accounts man-
aged by nonmember firms are deemed to be "controlled" accounts unless affirmatively 
shown to be otherwise. For the NYSE's position and a sharp criticism by Senator 
Williams in a letter to Acting SEC Chairman Owens, see BNA SEc. REG. & L. REP. No. 
210, at A-11 Guly II, 1973). Recently, the SEC indicated its disapproval of the sug-
gested change, pointing out that nonmember broker-dealers should not "be subjected 
to more rigorous criteria for access purposes than those established for brokers enjoying 
membership." Wall St. J., Aug. 31, 1973, at 7, col. 2 (midwest ed.). See SEC Securities 
Exchange Act Release No. 10391, BNA SEC. REG. &: L. REP. No. 219, at F-1 (Sept. 19, 
1973). 
There are eight enumerated exceptions to the rule, see 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.10b-2(a)(l) 
to (8) (1973), which, according to the SEC's release, "are comprised of market-making 
transactions and other transactions which contribute to depth, liquidity, stability and 
continuity." SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9950, supra, at 3921. The excep• 
tions are: specialists' transactions and transactions by a block positioner (except where 
an affiliated person is a party to the transaction), certain stabilizing or arbitrage trans-
actions, transactions effected in conformity with a plan adopted by the SEC and designed 
to eliminate floor trading activities that are not beneficial to the market, and transactions 
made with the prior approval of a floor official that contribute to the maintenance of 
a fair and orderly market. 
241. See generally SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9950, supra note 237. 
242. Although at the time when the SEC rule was adopted the Senate subcommittee 
had not officially reached a decision on the question of instsitutional membership, the 
matter was under active consideration, and the views of the subcommittee chairman 
were well known. See Wall St. J., Jan. 19, 1973, at 5, col. 4 (eastern ed.); id., Jan. 17, 
1973, at 3, col. 1; id., Oct. 12, 1972, at 17, col. 3. 
243. Id., Oct. 5, 1972, at 22, col. 2. The SEC's action also prompted a critical editorial 
in the New York Times Gan. 25, 1973, at 38, col. 2 (late city ed.)). 
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In addition, the PBW Stock Exchange challenged the validity 
of the rule because the SEC had failed to permit institutions that 
had held exchange memberships prior to February 2, 1972, to con-
tinue their membership for a three-year period without declaring 
their intent to be bound by the rule. The PBW suit was dismissed 
by the third circuit for lack of jurisdiction; a majority of the panel 
held that the rule 19b-2 was not a reviewable order within the scope 
of the Securities Exchange Act.244 Further litigation on this matter 
will no doubt be expensive and quixotic; the SEC is a powerful 
antagonist, and it may well prevail in the courts unless Congress 
takes some action to the contrary. Moreover, even if the PBW 
Stock Exchange were eventually to succeed, the victory might be a 
Pyrrhic one if it established the right of an institution to join any 
national securities exchange. Since institutions would in that event 
undoubtedly choose to join the NYSE and the AMEX, there would 
be less reason for them to seek membership on regional exchanges 
such as the PBW.245 Finally, as a consultant to the PBW Stock Ex-
change pointed out, if the Exchange were forced by the SEC to ex-
clude persons from its membership it would be in a "strong position 
1vith respect to antitrust considerations."246 
Perhaps illustrating the statement that "[a] regulatory agency 
usually becomes dominated by the industry which it was created to 
regulate,"247 the rule received a warm welcome by the NYSE, 
whose recently appointed chairman (formerly an SEC commissioner) 
described it as "a major step in the public interest toward the crea-
tion of a central securities market."248 In all fairness, however, one 
should examine the underlying policy justifications given by the 
SEC for its action, the most important of which was its belief that 
244. PBW Stock Exch., Inc. v. SEC, 42 U.SL.W. 2191 (3d Cir., Sept. 28, 1973). The 
Exchange had originally agreed to withdraw its opposition to the rule in return for an 
SEC promise to phase the rule in over a three-year period. See Wall St. J., Feb. 9, 1973, 
at 6, col. 2 (eastern ed.); N.Y. Times, Feb. 9, 1973, at 45, col. 5 (late city ed.). 
In addition, the Treasurer of the State of Connecticut has asked that the Justice 
Department contest the validity of the rule under the antitrust laws. See BNA SEC. 
REG. & L. REP. No. 188, at A-2 (Feb. 7, 1973). The Justice Department has urged a 
federal district court in Thill Sec. Corp. v. NYSE, 433 F.2d 264 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. 
denied, 401 U.S. 999 (1971), to outlaw fixed brokerage commissions for all exchange 
member firms by no later than July 1974. See BNA SEC. REG. & L. REP. No. 201, at A-13 
(May 9, 1973). For the SEC's brief in the PBW case, see BNA SEC. REG. & L. REP. No. 
202, at D-1 (May 16, 1973). 
245. See BNA SEC. REG. & L. REP. No. 181, at B-6 (Dec. 13, 1972). 
246. See N.Y. Times, Nov. 30, 1972, at 69, col. 3 (late city ed.). 
247. Thill Sec. Corp. v. NYSE, 433 F.2d 264, 273 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 
U.S. 994 (1971). 
248. N.Y. Times, Jan. 25, 1973, at 38, col. 2 (late city ed.), quoting James J. Needham. 
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unrestricted institutional membership would severely undermine 
the SEC's asserted objective of gradually phasing in negotiated rates, 
lowering the breakpoint in stages, and monitoring the industry for 
adverse effects. If institutions were permitted to become members 
of exchanges for the purpose of recapturing commissions, "that 
would be tantamount to competitive rates (or no commissions at all) 
on all size orders for those institutions immediately; the Commis-
sion's phase-in program would then become an academic exercise, 
at best."240 The SEC also believed that institutional membership on 
regional exchanges, if permitted to continue without substantial re-
strictions, might result in a change, perhaps irreversible, in the 
entire character of the securities markets. The emphasis might shift 
away from the auction process to a dealer market dominated by in-
stitutions trading primarily for their own benefit. Such a market 
might create abuses akin to those traditionally associated with "floor 
traders" and might further discourage small investors from par-
ticipating. 250 
'While not without merit, these policy considerations do not ac-
count for the manner in which the SEC acted. The SEC's objectives 
could have been achieved equally well (if not more satisfactorily) if it 
had adopted the approach suggested by the congressional subcommit-
tees, namely to condition exchange membership on a firm's doing all of 
its business with nonaffiliates (instead of eighty per cent). The SEC's 
eighty per cent solution was ostensibly justified by the need to proceed 
cautiously and gradually, with a "flexible" approach that would not 
entail "undue disruption of the capital-raising mechanism of our eco-
nomic system."251 As pointed out by the House subcommittee in its re-
port, however, this test merely exacerbates existing problems by en-
couraging larger firms that do extensive institutional business to 
compete more aggressively with smaller regional firms in order to 
acquire more "public" business to meet the eighty per cent require-
ment. 252 Indeed, according to the Justice Department, the SEC's new 
test might result in a "wave of mergers between institutional in-
vestors and leading brokerage firms that are already members on an 
exchange. This would not be desirable."2113 In addition, the percent-
age test might create difficult bookkeeping problems and encourage 
"churning" of public customers' accounts to increase business if 
249. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9950, supra note 237, at 3916. 
250. Id. at 3917-19. 
251. Id. at 3920. 
252. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 4, at 152. 
253. House Hearings, supra note 5, pt. 8, at 4119 (statement of Donald I. Baker). 
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necessary to meet the eighty per cent requirement. Although the SEC 
argued that the antitrust laws are "more than adequate" to prevent 
undesirable mergers within the industry and that it would itself 
be able to prevent unlawful "churning" through the use of its 
existing administrative powers,254 it seems anomalous to adopt a 
rule that might increase the likelihood of such unlawful activity 
and, consequently, the administrative burden and cost of prevent-
ing it.255 
The salient feature of the controversy is that the SEC, as a 
statutory creature, presumably responsive to congressional control 
and oversight, has a heavy burden of proof to justify its activities 
in an area that is likely to be dealt with differently on a legislative 
level. On the other hand, it could be argued that the SEC may be 
acting within its statutory powers256 and that it would be a derelic-
tion of its duty to stand idly by while the matter is resolved through 
a more lengthy and cumbersome legislative process, particularly if 
the legislative outcome is itself uncertain.257 This argument, how-
254. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9950, supra note 237, at 3939 n.409. 
255. It should be noted that under the SEC's rule, as well as under the various pro-
posals made by the congressional subcommittees, there may be a persistent administra-
tive problem in policing attempts to evade the rule by various types of reciprocal 
business practices. Thus, one institution may informally agree with another to place 
brokerage with the other institution's affiliated member firm in exchange for an equal 
amount of commission business sent by that other institution to the first institution's 
affiliated member firm. The House report recognized the problem but saw no practical 
solution other than to rely on ·the SEC to monitor the situation closely and "take what-
ever steps are needed to prevent this type of reciprocal business." HousE REPORT, supra 
note 4, at 152-53. The bill passed by the Senate makes it "unlawful .•. to utilize any 
scheme, device, arrangement, agreement, or understanding designed to circumvent or 
avoid, by reciprocal means or in any other manner, the policy and purposes of this 
subsection." S. 470, § 2, passed by the Senate, June 18, 1973, in 119 CoNG. REc. S11366 
(daily ed. June 18, 1973). 
256. Compare SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9950, supra note 237, at 3907-
14, with HousE REPORT, supra note 4, at 152 n.25. The question whether the SEC has 
power to deal with the problem of exchange membership is troublesome, and the legis-
lative history is not entirely clear. Section 19(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78s(b) (1970), does not expressly confer authority on the SEC to act with respect to 
rules on exchange membership. Any SEC power in this area must be implied from its 
authority to deal with "the fixing of reasonable rates of commission • • • and other 
charges" (subsection 19(b)(9)) or its authority over "similar matters" (subsection 19(b) 
(13)) (i.e., matters similar to those enumerated expressly in subsections 19(b)(l)-(12)). 
Thomas Corcoran, one of the draftsmen of the Securities Exchange Act, at one point 
expressed his view that the SEC did have power in this area. See Hearings on H.R. 
7852 and H.R. 8720 Before the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d 
Cong., 2d Sess. 125 (1934). 
257. In view of the fact that the SEC's rule has been favorably received by most of 
the exchanges (except for the PBW Stock Exchange, see text accompanying note 244 
supra) there is a very real question of whether more restrictive legislation will be passed 
without the support of significant segments of the industry and the SEC. More recently, 
SEC Commissioner Loomis indicated to the House subcommittee that he was in general 
agreement with the sections of the House bill dealing with coml!lission rates and access 
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ever, appears to lose sight of the overwhelming importance of per-
mitting the democratic process to operate on an issue of such per-
vasive significance. 
The House subcommittee has introduced a bill to implement 
its recommendations and to prohibit exchange members from trans-
acting business with affiliated persons after February 1, 1974, the 
deadline set by the subcommittee for reducing the break.point for 
negotiated rates to 100,000 dollars. Included in the definition of 
affiliated persons are pension, profit-sharing, or similar plans where 
an exchange member has investment discretion or with respect to 
which it regularly furnishes investment advice. Persons who were 
exchange members prior to February l, 1973, are given a period of 
not more than one year from the effective date of the legislation 
within which to comply with its provisions.258 The Senate has al-
ready passed a bill dealing with institutional membership.259 
V. CONCLUSION 
The various studies of the securities industry that resulted from 
the crisis period in the late l 960's have given rise to a broad-ranging 
program of legislative and administrative reform. Broker-dealer 
financial stability will be strengthened by more uniform rules on 
net capital, use of customers' funds and securities, clearance and 
settlement procedures, standards for entry into the securities busi-
ness, as well as accounting, auditing, and reporting procedures. Self-
regulation, a unique characteristic of the industry from the incep-
tion of securities regulation, will persist, but it will be strengthened 
and reinforced through increased regulatory control by the SEC, 
with particular emphasis on ensuring fairness and adequate review 
of disciplinary and other proceedings (including rule-making) by 
self-regulatory bodies. The SEC itself will be strengthened through 
increased budgetary allotments, as well as legislative reforms that will 
ensure the effective use by Congress of its oversight functions. Ten-
sions that have arisen as a result of pressures brought to bear by 
increasing institutionalization of the markets on the system of fixed 
to the central market system (e.g., institutional membership), arguing only tbat there be 
greater flexibility in tbe timetable for implementing full competitive rates. BNA SEc. 
REG. & L. REP. No. 206, at A-19 Gune 13, 1973). 
258. H.R. 5050, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 205 (1973). For comparable legislation passed 
by tbe Senate, see S. 470, § 2, passed by the Senate, June 18, 1973, in 119 CONG. REc. 
Sll366 (daily ed. June 18, 1973). See note 240 supra. Senator Sparkman has introduced 
a measure that would postpone tbe effective date of prohibiting exchange members 
from doing business witb tbeir affiliates for ten years, which is his suggested phase-in 
period for negotiated rates. S. 488, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). 
259. See text accompanying notes 189-92 supra. 
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comm1ss1on rates will eventually be resolved through the imple-
mentation of negotiated or competitive rates. Although the aban-
donment of fixed commission rates may have an adverse effect on 
inefficient firms, well managed firms (including smaller regional 
firms) will survive and indeed ·will flourish under competitive rates. 
Fears that this will lead to concentration of brokerage business in 
the hands of a few large firms are unjustified. Similarly, there is little 
evidence that competitive rates will have an adverse effect on the 
markets themselves, or on smaller investors. Indeed, fixed rates have, 
in the past, been a major impediment to the establishment of a cen-
tral market system. Such a system, characterized by greater uniform-
ity in regulation and disclosure among competing market centers, 
will result in extensive savings to large and small investors alike, 
as well as to securities firms dealing on their behalf. These savings 
will in turn encourage firms to engage in more business for smaller 
investors. The market itself will thus become a more attractive in-
vestment vehicle for large numbers of persons with a diversity of 
investment objectives. These reforms will strengthen the present 
auction market, rather than lead to its demise, as predicted by some 
critics. Access to the system will be available to all broker-dealers 
qualifying under suitable professional and financial standards. In-
stitutions, if they care to become members of the market system, 
may do so on the conditions that they perform no brokerage for 
themselves and that no such brokerage be performed for their ac-
count by an affiliated member firm. 
